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1. Introduction 
 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-
combatants have become an important component of many, if not most, post-conflict 
stabilisation, peace-building and recovery programmes over the 15 – 20 years.  They 
are specifically focussed on ‘ex-combatants’, a category which for DDR purposes 
includes direct ex-combatants and those closely associated with them including 
spouses, ‘camp followers’ and dependents.  
 
The experience with DDR has provided many lessons. International standards and 
good-practice guidelines for DDR have become relatively highly elaborated in recent 
years. The UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration Standards 
(IDDRS) represent the fullest expression of this, composed of some 800 pages of 
detailed guidance to practitioners, as distilled by a special UN Inter-Agency Working 
Group and the work of dozens of international experts.1 Such standards are recently 
developed, and their adoption and usefulness has yet to be fully tested. One overall 
aim of this project is to critically examine the understandings informing such 
standards, and clarify how they may be revised or developed.  
 
It is clear that there are continuing problems in practice. For example, several recent 
UN-mandated DDR programmes have seriously struggled to establish an effective 
focus, and have in some cases had to be re-launched several times. Haiti and Southern 
Sudan provide two examples of this. Part of the problem is that DDR programmes are 
continuing to be mandated as if they can in themselves address much of a war-torn 
country’s post-conflict security building needs. In fact, DDR needs to be co-ordinated 
with a range of other post-conflict security building programmes, including Security 
Sector Reform (SSR), wider arms collection and management programmes, 
transitional justice, peace-building and reconciliation processes. DDR needs to be one 
of several peace and security-building programmes, all co-ordinated within the overall 
framework of a broad peace-building and recovery strategy and process.2  
 
                                                 
1  UN, “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration Standards”,  December 2006, 
available at www.unddr.org/iddrs. 
2 As emphasised, for example, in the Report of the UN Secretary General on Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration, UN General Assembly Document A/60/705, 2 March 2006; and also 
in the IDDRS, ibid. 
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The importance of this process of co-ordination, and in particular the linkages 
between DDR and SSR processes in countries emerging from conflict, have 
increasingly been recognised in a number of reports and guidelines. Some key recent 
examples include the Final Report of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament 
Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR---2006); UN IDDRS (2006); UNDP Practice 
Note on DDR (2005); and UN Security Council Debate on SSR (February 2007).  
 
In principle, the argument for recognising strong linkages between DDR and SSR 
programmes in post-conflict contexts is strong and easy to make.  DDR focuses 
primarily on ex-combatants and their direct dependents, as a way of contributing to 
the security of wider communities as well as state stabilisation. It thus needs to be 
complemented and reinforced by SSR programmes, designed to reconstitute, reform 
and improve the security sector institutions and agencies to address the justice and 
security needs of all of the citizens and communities in the relevant conflict-affected 
countries. Moreover, the implementation and management of DDR programmes 
typically involves national security agencies and institutions: raising issues (for 
example) of capacity-building and reform of such institutions as they seek to play 
their role in DDR.  
 
There are numerous potentially important programmatic links between SSR and DDR 
strategies and programmes, in addition to the institutional linkages noted above. For 
example, whether and how ex-combatants may be integrated into military or police 
structures intrinsically raises institutional reform issues for these security 
organisations. SSR and DDR processes need to be co-ordinated to reduce the risks of 
violence and insecurity from informal armed militias or demobilised soldiers. The 
demobilisation package and guarantees offered to ex-combatants should take into 
account possible transitional justice issues, such as the extent to which perpetrators of 
war crimes are eligible or vetted, and the comparability with possible reparations 
packages. 
 
However, much remains to be done to research experience of the interactions (positive 
and negative) between SSR and DDR processes, and to clarify how best to co-
ordinate or integrate SSR and DDR programmes in practice. It is important to be 
realistic about what is practicable in post-conflict contexts, and (for example) to 
establish priorities and understandings about timing and sequencing. There is little 
guidance on such issues: for example they receive little attention in the new UN 
IDDRS: a fact which the UN aims to rectify by the end of 2008, through an additional 
IDDRS chapter on SSR-DDR linkages.   
 
This paper is relevant to this new IDDRS chapter, since it includes a mapping and 
review of experience with the interplay between SSR and DDR programmes, and the 
ways in which DDR practitioners should take into account and make use of SSR-DDR 
links. However, the focus of the chapter is not to provide an informal draft of such a 
document, but rather to explore the possibilities of going beyond such an IDDRS 
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framework - towards deeper co-ordination, if not integration, of DDR and SSR 
programmes in post conflict contexts.  
 
The paper aims to examine the actual and potential linkages between DDR and SSR 
programmes and processes, in order to clarify these important issues. In doing so, it 
aims to contribute to an important and urgent emerging debate for policy-makers and 
practitioners on how best to operationalise links between SSR and DDR.  
 
The Working Paper contributes to our larger project on ‘DDR and human security: 
post-conflict security-building and the interests of the poor’. Its relevance to this 
wider project is high. SSR processes must be central to efforts to promote and ensure 
a secure environment for communities and individuals in war-torn societies, and poor 
and vulnerable people are typically particularly in need for this. If DDR programmes 
are to contribute effectively to human security, they not only need to be designed and 
implemented directly to do this but also need to reinforce appropriate SSR and access 
to justice (or at a minimum to not undermine its prospects).  
 
All of this needs to be achieved through improved overall integration and co-
ordination of post-conflict security-building processes in which SSR and DDR are 
two key elements of a wider strategy including SALW control, community security 
building and wider peace-building. This paper thus links substantially with Working 
Paper 3 in this project working paper series, which focuses on enhanced linkages and 
integration between DDR and SALW reduction/control programmes. The overall 
objective is not simply to promote improved bilateral co-ordination or integration 
between DDR and SALW control and SSR respectively. Instead, the aim is to argue 
for a wider integration of all three post-conflict security-building programmes into 
comprehensive customised programmes to promote human security from violence and 
coercion in countries emerging from conflict. 
The Working Paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some initial 
definitions and briefly outlines the roles of DDR and SSR processes in post-conflict 
contexts. Section 3 then aims to map the range of actual and potential links between 
DDR and SSR programmes. The purpose of this is to unpack the many types of links 
and interrelationships that could exist, in order briefly to examine each in turn and to 
assess their relative importance (to the extent that this is possible generically).  
 
The following two sections aim to illustrate and examine experience so far. Section 4 
examines experience relating to selected sectors of the security system, and includes 
some short country case studies, each aimed to highlight the extent to which SSR-
DDR linkages were important and effectively managed. Section 5 of the Working 
Paper focuses on examining the policy, programmatic and operational implications of 
national or international commitments to ensure effective co-ordination and/or 
integration of DDR and SSR processes. We argue that DDR and SSR programmes 
should be planned and carefully co-ordinated within an overall integrated and 
coherent post-conflict peace and security building process. The first part of Section 5 
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explores the mechanisms, priorities, and challenges for doing this in the best case: 
where the relevant local and international political authorities and mission heads are 
committed to such an approach from an early stage – before the peace agreement is 
signed. It subsequently examines possible recovery strategies where such commitment 
is initially lacking, so that efforts to develop co-ordination between DDR and SSR 
have to start after DDR and wider post-conflict recovery programmes have already 
started.  
 
Section 6 provides conclusions and emerging policy implications. Some of these 
essentially imply further development of co-ordination between DDR and SSR 
programmes within the present international framework. Others, however, raise more 
profound questions about the overall approach to planning and implementing SSR and 
DDR in post-conflict contexts. We outline a possible alternative strategic approach to 
the design and implementation of post-conflict programmes designed to promote 
human security. In this approach, the focus is on designing and implementing an 
overall integrated security-building programme customised to the specific 
circumstances of the country and time concerned. It is the integrity of this programme 
that needs to be optimised, rather than the integration of DDR and SSR processes in 
themselves. This raises the possibility of a new ‘modular’ approach to the various 
potential elements of any ‘DDR’ and ‘SSR’ process of programme; in which relevant 
elements are combined in a more customised way.  
 
2. DDR and SSR Processes as Conflicts Come to an End  
 
This section aims briefly to outline key characteristics and roles of DDR and SSR 
programmes in countries emerging from conflicts. It main purpose is to provide a 
basis for the mapping of the relationships between DDR and SSR processes in Section 
3, and for the discussions in the remainder of this working paper. It does not aim to 
provide a detailed review of either DDR or SSR - each should be understood as highly 
political as well as technical processes, and as complex and contested.   
 
2.1 Security sector reform 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) broadly refers to reforms or transformations to enhance 
the effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy or democratic accountability of the ‘security 
sector’ so that it provides the security services needed by the citizens and 
communities of the country concerned. It may involve reforms of security services or 
institutions, or measures to strengthen civilian management or democratic governance 
and accountability of the sector and its institutions.3  
 
                                                 
3 OECD DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series; 
OECD, 2005. 
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The scope of what should be included in the ‘security sector’ is still debated, and 
depends to some extent on the policy context. It includes: 
 
• ‘Core’ security agencies and institutions: military, police, presidential 
guards, intelligence services, national guards, border guards, coastguards, 
prisons, etc. 
 
• Security governance and oversight institutions: government executive, 
National Security Council, Ministries of defence, interior and justice, 
Legislature/Parliament, local authorities, ombudsmen, traditional/customary 
authorities; 
 
• Justice and rule of law institutions: judiciary, prosecution service, penal 
service, traditional/customary justice systems.  
 
In addition, some commentators also include non-statutory security forces, including 
private security companies, body-guard units, political party militias, or liberation or 
guerrilla armies. These are indicative of a number of important ‘grey areas’, which 
need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. In general, we take the approach that all 
legal bodies or groups that provide security services should be included in our 
understanding of the ‘security sector’. Further, if there are government tolerated or 
supported bodies, such as paramilitary or militias, or ‘traditional’ authorities that play 
a role that is widely recognised if not fully legalised, they too should be included, 
although with a clear understanding that reform processes need to aim to ensure that 
these are either made fully legal and accountable or are abolished.  
Box 1: Illustration of types of SSR programmes or processes 
• Conduct of national security strategy reviews 
• Development of national security strategy implementation plans 
• Development of national, provincial and sectoral SSR strategies 
• Enhancement of democratic or legal accountability of security sector policies 
and institutions; including improved civilian governance and control; 
improved parliamentary oversight and accountability structures; enhanced 
openness or engagement with citizenry 
• Integrated reform of a sector of security provision (e.g. reform of the criminal 
justice system or border management system) 
• Institutional reform of single security sector services or institutions, to enhance 
effectiveness (including capacity, efficiency, relevance), accountability and 
legitimacy (e.g. police reform, defence reform; budgetary reform)  
 
 
The OECD DAC definition of SSR is one that is now widely used, and reflects a 
particular approach to SSR, formulating it as ‘security system reform’, and placing it 
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within a development framework. According to this definition, SSR concerns the 
transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles 
responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a 
manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance, thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. This 
formulation has been developed to express a developmental approach to SSR, 
endorsed in the first instance by donor development aid agencies. This approach has 
been developed and promoted within a wider framework of developmental principles, 
which emphasise a focus on providing a secure environment for wider economic, 
social and political development for the whole country, including the poorest and 
most vulnerable. It emphasises factors such as ‘local ownership’, good governance 
and accountability, and sustainability, with human security at the forefront, and 
‘regime security’ and ‘state security’ relevant only to the extent that these contribute 
to human security and development.  
 
This is therefore an approach that is consistent with the priorities of our ‘DDR and 
Human Security’ project. Elaborated good practice guidelines have recently been 
published by the OECD DAC to support implementation, which although they are so 
far untested, are of value for those concerned with implementing SSR nationally as 
well as for international agencies offering external support.4 
 
2.2 SSR in post-conflict contexts 
SSR is best seen as a continuous process that is relevant to all countries and regions, 
including politically stable developed and developing states as well as fragile states 
and post-conflict countries. However, it is widely understood that there are 
particularly urgent SSR priorities in countries emerging from large-scale violent 
conflict.   
 
Almost by definition, much of the security sector needs to be restructured after large-
scale armed conflict, to reflect the requirements for political settlement, post-conflict 
stabilisation and peace-building, and to address the high insecurity, violence and 
crime that ordinary communities and people typically continue to face. In this post-
conflict context, concerns for the security and viability of the new government 
(regime security) and of the emerging legitimate state institutions and borders (state 
security) are inevitably a high priority – for the national leaderships of the affected 
country and its neighbours, and for the UN and wider international community. 
Arguments that these are necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for promoting 
security of the wider population are generally persuasive.  
 
However, it is also important to note the risks that SSR can be used less benignly to 
challenge or consolidate the power of specific groups for selfish interests. In practice, 
                                                 
4 OECD DAC Handbook, Supporting Security and Justice, OECD DAC, 2007.  
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therefore, SSR issues and processes have been prominent in most post-conflict peace-
building, whether labelled as such or not.  This has been true for decades (and 
centuries), but as the UN and other multilateral organisations have become more 
intensively engagement in peace-support missions over the last 15 years, they have 
similarly been drawn into engaging with SSR. 5 
 
There are a number of recent studies of SSR processes after wars come to end, either 
through peace-agreements or through victory by one of the parties.6 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the findings show a wide variety of complex, highly politicised and 
contentious processes, with many examples of bad or confused practices as well as 
good ones. Where peace agreements or processes have stalled or broken down, this is 
generally linked to failures or problems around security institutions and SSR. Often 
SSR processes have been geared to the priorities of the primary power-brokers and 
national elites, rather than the wider population, leading to alienation and enduring 
state fragility. They are also often ‘supply-driven’ to some extent, in line with the 
perceived priorities of donors and their local allies. Nevertheless, there are examples 
of (relative) success – although also mixed with some failures, such as in South Africa 
and Mozambique. Section 4 of this working paper provides brief outlines and cases 
studies to illustrate such issues and experiences.  
 
The experience and effectiveness of UN Missions in supporting and promoting 
appropriate SSR has been similarly very mixed.7 One important contributing factor is 
that the UN lacks a clear and developed approach towards SSR in peace-support 
missions, or more widely in its conflict prevention and reduction activities. This is in 
strong contrast to DDR programmes, which are routinely and explicitly mandated by 
the UN Security Council and for which elaborated guidelines have been developed 
and periodically revised. There are several multilateral agencies within the UN family 
that have developed substantial institutional capacity and expertise for supporting all 
or part of DDR programmes, including the UNDPKO, UNDP, World Bank, IoM, and 
UNICEF. It is important to emphasise that UN agencies have tended to be less 
prominent and important in SSR processes than other actors such as bilateral donors, 
the OSCE or the EU. 
 
There are several political reasons why shared international understandings and 
pooled capacities to support SSR have been relatively slow to develop. Many SSR 
                                                 
5 See, for example, H. Hanggi and V. Scherrer, “Towards a Common UN Approach to Security Sector 
Reform: lessons learned from integrated missions” (DCAF Policy Paper No 25; November 2007, 
DCAD), for a good summary of emerging UN engagement with SSR in post-conflict support missions.  
6 See for example, Edward Rees, “Security Sector reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: ‘improvisation 
and confusion’ from the field”, UNDPKO External Study, UN March 2006; A. Schnabel and H-G 
Ehrhart (eds), Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, UN University Press, New 
York, 2005; A. Bryden and H. Hanggi (eds), Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
DCAF, Lit Verlag, Munster, 2005; and also the case studies in H. Hanggi and V. Scherrer (eds): 
Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: experience from Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo, DCAF/LIT VERLAG, Geneva, 2008. 
7 See for example Rees (2006), op cit; Hanggi and Scherrer (2008), op cit. 
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processes, as well as DDR processes, have developed as well as implemented at a 
national level, with little international awareness. Alternatively, where SSR processes 
have had an international dimension, reforms have often been conceived and 
implemented through bilateral arrangements in which a donor country has formulated 
its own support programme together with national governments or specific security 
agencies. This has understandably led to divergent forms of programming in many 
cases.  
 
More problematically, within the UN, influential members of the UN Security 
Council as well as much of the General Assembly have been reluctant to endorse 
explicitly support for SSR in post-conflict or other contexts. Efforts to influence or re-
shape countries’ security institutions have raised concerns about implications for 
‘sovereignty’. There has been a high degree of suspicion that SSR may be a cover for 
self-interested pursuit of contestable foreign and security policy objectives. This 
suspicion continues to be shared by some in development aid agencies. In contrast, the 
objectives of DDR have been regarded as less political and more limited in scope and 
duration.  
 
Further, development of UN programmes and capacities to support SSR processes has 
been obstructed by institutional inertia and has raised concerns about inappropriate 
diversion of development or other aid resources.  
 
Nevertheless, over the last seven years, substantial progress towards international co-
operation and support for SSR has been achieved. This is manifest in the OECD DAC 
guidelines, relevant UNDP and World Bank programmes, and greatly enhanced co-
operation amongst bilateral donors building on previous policy and programme 
work.8 In relation to post-conflict peacebuilding, the UN has recognised the critical 
importance of post-conflict policing and rule of law missions. Following the ‘Brahimi 
report’ in 2000,9 and particularly since 2003, UNDPKO and associated agencies have 
substantially developed guidelines, doctrine and capacity to support the timely and 
effective deployment of a variety of types of missions to provide or support post-
conflict policing and rule of law.  
 
In 2006, through a UN Working Group on SSR, the UN actively engaged in a political 
and policy process to clarify its position on support for SSR, culminating in important 
political decisions in February 2007 to establish an SSR Unit within the UN HQ (co-
led by UNDPKO and UNDP). The UN Security Council held a productive debate on 
20 -21 February 2007, where the Secretary-General noted that ‘UNSC peacekeeping 
                                                 
8 Although many donor countries have been active in supporting SSR both at the policy and 
programme levels over the years, the work of the governments of the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland 
is particularly noteworthy. For past contributions in the policy field, see for example, “Understanding 
and Supporting Security Sector Reform”, DFID, 2000; “Justice and Poverty Reduction: Safety, 
Security and Access to Justice For All”, DFID, 2000. 
9“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”, at 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations.  
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mandates increasingly reflect the perspectives of security sector reform’, and 
highlighted examples of immediate UN priorities including: SSR in the DRC; 
institutional reforms and the constitution of integrated security forces in Burundi; 
strengthening Sierra Leone’s security sector; and supporting the restructuring of the 
defence and security forces in Cote D’Ivoire.10 
 
This UN process could lead to some distinctive understandings of the scope and focus 
of SSR support in post-conflict or conflict-prone countries. Several key members of 
the UN Security Council have emphasised that: 
 
• UN engagement in SSR should be limited to post-conflict countries; 
• While the UN has strong comparative advantage for overall co-ordination of 
post-conflict peace support and peace-building, it may not be the key co-
ordinator for SSR; 
• National ‘ownership’ of SSR processes is particularly important (but with very 
different emphases on what is meant by national ownership); 
• That a comprehensive approach to SSR is required. 11  
 
The UN Policy Committee has recommended that an SSR Support Unit be established 
in the DPKO Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (and at the time of 
writing this Unit is being established). In practice, a combination of UN politics and 
bureaucratic or institutional concerns resulted in strong bargaining about whether 
‘policing and rule of law’ should be considered to be within the scope of SSR. 
Specialist UN units and doctrine on policing and rule of law have already been 
established, and there has been resistance to integrating these into a new SSR policy 
or Unit. The risk remains then that for the UN, post-conflict SSR missions may come 
to include reform of military, border guards, coastguards etc, but to exclude policing 
and rule of law (criminal justice system etc).  Wider institutional tensions and 
differences in perspective on SSR (such as between DPKO and UNDP) remain 
unresolved, and are likely to influence emerging UN systems and structures.  
 
In principle possible complex UN institutional division of labour may be manageable, 
provided that is does not lead to confusion and unproductive doctrinal debates. In this 
paper, we consider that SSR has the full scope outlined at the beginning of this 
section, and so may be addressed by several hopefully coherent and co-ordinated UN 
Units, policies and agencies.   
 
                                                 
10 UN Secretary-General, ‘Remarks to the UN Security Council Debate on the Role of the Security 
Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform’ UN New York, 20 February 2007. 
11 UN, Summary of the Debate in the UN Security Council on Security Sector Reform, 21 February 
2007. 
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2.3 DDR processes 
DDR is primarily concerned with promoting security and post-conflict stabilisation in 
the immediate post-conflict period by ensuring that ex-combatants and their close 
associates and dependents are taken out of the conflict context; disarmed and 
demobilised as appropriate/agreed; and provided with a package of support to enable 
them to be re-inserted into the wider community and as far as possible re-integrated – 
to reduce the risk that they re-engage in armed violence or otherwise destabilise the 
peace process.12  
 
Although the primary focus of DDR is on ex-combatants, it is now well-established 
that DDR programmes should address the needs of a wider target group, which 
includes: 
 
• Male and female (ex-)combatants; 
• Children associated with armed forces and groups; 
• ‘camp-followers’ working in non-combat roles (including women as well as 
men in a range of coerced or voluntary roles; 
• ex-combatants with disabilities or chronic illnesses; 
• dependents of (ex-) combatants. 
 
‘Classic’ DDR programmes are designed for a context in which there is a peace 
agreement in place, and political commitment and capacity amongst relevant political 
and military leaders to demobilise and disarm at least a proportion of their forces. In 
UNSC-mandated DDR programmes, the disarmament, demobilisation and re-insertion 
elements13 are resourced through assessed contributions, while the reintegration 
elements require additional voluntary contributions from member states.  
 
At this point, it is important to emphasise that in practice, DDR programmes have 
been mandated for post-conflict contexts which do not meet all the assumptions of the 
‘classic’ model. For example, only some of the armed groups may be committed to 
the agreements; many fragmented armed groups may be involved, under uncertain or 
ineffective central command; and there may be on-going violence in some areas. 
Examples include DDR programmes in Haiti, Southern Sudan and the Solomon 
                                                 
12 We assume that readers are relatively familiar with DDR programmes and practices (see Working 
Paper 1 of this project, and standard references on DDR, including the UN IDDRS and associated 
(shorter) Operational Guide to the IDDRS), at http://www.unddr.org/iddrs. 
13Disarmament: the collection, documentation, control and safe disposal of arms and ammunition 
from ex-combatants; linked with the development of appropriate arms management programmes; 
Demobilisation: the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and other 
armed groups. This often includes processing of ex-combatants in temporary cantonments or assembly 
areas. Demobilisation also includes Reinsertion: transitional assistance offered to ex-combatants 
during the demobilisation process, to meet their immediate needs. Such re-insertion support packages 
typically last for a few months, and up to about 18 months; Reintegration: the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and reintegrate into with wider community – hopefully gaining 
sustainable and useful employment, income and social position.  
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Islands. In practice, therefore, DDR programmes have sometimes sought to include a 
wider range of elements to those listed above, and have covered a relatively large 
number of possible direct beneficiaries going beyond ‘core’ ex-combatants and their 
direct dependents and camp followers.  
 
It is further important to note that not all DDR processes take place in the context of 
an internationally-recognised peace agreement or a UN peace mission. Programmes of 
very similar nature may be conducted on a purely national basis, or under the control 
of a victorious party (such as in Angola). 
 
2.4 Comparing principles and approaches of DDR and SSR 
It is useful at this point briefly to compare and discuss the principles and norms 
underlying DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts. This will enable us 
to highlight some key similarities and differences that need to be taken into account 
when considering enhanced co-ordination and integration of DDR and SSR 
programmes and processes in countries emerging from conflict. 
 
In terms of overall good practice principles, there should be high compatibility 
between internationally supported DDR and SSR programmes. For example, 
according to the IDDRS guidelines and OECD-DAC guidance for SSR, they aim to 
be: people-centred and rights based, flexible, transparent and accountable, nationally 
owned, integrated, and well-planned.14 Practical experience in both programme 
spheres has often fallen short of these aims, but overlapping principles and goals 
should facilitate better linkages between them.  
 
Overlapping aims. Both DDR and SSR aim to promote a secure and stable 
environment enable recovery, peace-building and development to begin. DDR focuses 
on specific target groups centred on (ex-) combatants and their dependents, and aims 
to take opportunities for their orderly integration into agreed future defence forces or 
for their disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration into peaceful civilian roles. 
SSR focuses on reforming the security system and its component parts to promote the 
prospects for effective, legitimate and accountable provision of justice and security 
services in the country as it emerges from conflict. Thus, although they have 
distinctive foci and approaches, the aims of SSR and DDR overlap in several key 
areas, including: 
 
• Sustainable dismantlement of illegitimate or undesirable armed groups and 
command structures; 
• Appropriate resizing and restructuring of defence forces; 
                                                 
14  As noted and explored, for example, by A. Bryden “Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: building 
sustainable peace in Africa”, Paper presented at Second International Conference on DDR and 
Stability, Kinshasa, 12 – 14 July 2007 (available at www.dcaf.ch). 
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• Addressing the security and other needs of ex-combatants and associated 
vulnerable groups, as well as recipient communities as part of wider peace and 
security-building. 
 
In this context, both SSR and DDR aim to address both state and human security 
priorities. The balance between various dimensions of state and human security 
priorities must legitimately be decided according to specific circumstances. But in 
countries emerging from conflict there is always a potential perceived or actual 
tension between addressing security concerns of powerful groups in order to avoid 
resurgence of armed conflict and those of vulnerable wider sectors of society, whose 
needs may be greater even if they are less able to press for attention.  
 
Elements of a more comprehensive security and peace-building process. Neither 
DDR nor SSR are panaceas, capable (even in principle) of ensuring the development 
of a more secure environment in which humanitarian aid, re-construction, and peace-
building can take place. They both have to be approached as elements of a more 
comprehensive security and peace-building process, requiring co-ordination and 
synergies between a range of elements, also including: SALW control, transitional 
justice, mine action, IDP/refugee return, confidence-building measures, and so on.  
 
Engaging with processes that are intrinsic to post-conflict contexts. Even in the 
absence of planned programmes, some sorts of DDR and SSR processes are 
inevitable as countries emerge from conflict. Combatants and their dependents and 
commanders inevitably try to accommodate to the new emerging ‘post-conflict’ 
situation, with many demobilising and attempting to return to civilian roles. In a 
changing security context, powerful and other local stakeholders are bound to have 
high concerns about the  activities of security agencies or armed groups, and to try to 
impose controls and reforms on them (hopefully in line with a peace agreement). 
However, there is a high risk that such processes will remain dangerously incomplete 
or will contribute to insecurity, human suffering and risks of resurgent conflict.  
 
The purpose of planned DDR and SSR programmes is to ensure that such processes 
take place in a way that not only promotes the prospects of security and longer-term 
peace-building but also addresses the needs of the weak and vulnerable as well as the 
relatively powerful. Thus, it is mistake to approach either DDR or SSR programmes 
as if processes of demobilisation, re-structuring of armed groups, or changes of 
security sector institutions will not take place in their absence. Rather, they need to be 
designed and implemented in a way that takes careful account of existing local 
concerns, interests and dynamics – to shape, constrain and facilitate these in beneficial 
ways.  
 
Complex combinations of political and technical processes. Both DDR and SSR 
programmes are politically sensitive in the most benign of circumstances, and key 
local stakeholders are highly aware of this. They also involve substantial technical 
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complexities and procedures. In highly politicised post-conflict contexts, it often 
becomes important to find ways to discuss the support, planning and implementation 
of both DDR and SSR programmes as if they are in large measure rule-based 
technical procedures.  However, this should not distract programme teams from high 
awareness of the ways in which DDR and SSR programmes relate to wider political, 
security and peace-building processes. 
 
Challenges of co-ordinating short and long-term processes and objectives. All 
programmes in countries emerging from conflict have to cope with the challenges of 
addressing urgent short-term priorities in ways that are effectively co-ordinated with 
longer-term programme objectives. The IDDRS aims to guide the design and 
implementation of relatively short-term disarmament and demobilisation programmes 
so that they provide an enduring basis for longer-term peace-building. However, this 
requires effective use of in-depth assessments and reviews that are often inadequately 
achieved. Moreover, co-ordination of shorter-term D&D with longer-term re-
integration programmes has proved to be a major structural challenge for DDR 
programmes.  
 
Similarly, those engaged with SSR have to respond to immediate challenges or 
windows of opportunity (for example, relating to defence or police reform), as the 
conflict comes to an end, long before an appropriately inclusive process of 
determining future national security strategy and SSR strategy has been completed. 
All SSR processes face difficult choices on phasing and prioritisation, and there is an 
enduring tendency towards unsatisfactory piece-meal or ad-hoc reforms.  
 
One approach towards addressing this in relation to SSR-DDR linkages is to suggest 
(as implied in the IDDRS) that SSR should be regarded as a longer-term 
‘developmental’ process, which may only start as the DDR programme (or at least 
D&D) is coming to a close. In some circumstances this may be the case, but it is far 
from clear that this can or should be the norm. There is a real risk of confusing 
‘internationally-supported SSR programme’ with ‘SSR informal or local process’; the 
latter can be expected to begin early (for better or worse) even if the former starts late. 
Moreover, DDR programmes have often been delayed for particular reasons, opening 
the possibility that SSR programmes may start earlier. 
 
Challenges and priorities of ‘local ownership’. All international guidelines for DDR 
and SSR (including IDDRS and OECD-DAC IF-SSR guidelines) emphasise that 
‘local ownership’ of programmes is critically important for their effectiveness as well 
as legitimacy. However, ‘local ownership’ is a complex and contested concept in any 
context. It is especially so in countries emerging from conflict that, almost by 
definition, have deep political or societal divisions, weak or damaged representative 
institutions, and often limited expertise. Thus, local ownership can be expected to be 
highly partial or weak in the early stages of post-conflict programming, and the 
priority shifts towards enabling better, more influential and representative ‘local 
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ownership’ as the process evolves. In practice, the dilemmas, ways and means of 
achieving this for DDR and SSR can be expected to overlap substantially.  
 
 
3. DDR and SSR links in post-conflict contexts: initial mapping 
 
The main aim of this section is to provide an initial mapping of the actual and 
potential linkages between DDR and SSR processes in post-conflict contexts. At this 
stage, we confine ourselves to an initial ‘mapping’ and assessment of significance. 
Subsequent sections of this Working Paper will develop the analysis and 
systematically address key issues of prioritisation, programme design to facilitate 
synergies, and sequencing.  
 
This mapping has several dimensions and many elements, some of which overlap. At 
this stage we have adopted a simple organisational approach.15 The first subsection 
(3.1) focuses on linkages according to phases of the processes of assessing, designing 
and implementing DDR and SSR processes. Section 3.2 then identifies linkages 
related to cross-cutting issues (such as gender, youth, cross-border issues or transition 
to longer term development). Section 3.3 then addresses specific sectoral issues. It 
concludes with a brief summary of key initial findings and questions. 
 
For convenience, we have adopted the overall frameworks and structures for DDR 
and SSR programmes respectively of the IDDRS and the OECD DAC Handbook. 
Despite various shortcomings, these have become relatively authoritative and widely 
endorsed, and are also quite systematic and comprehensive as required for a mapping 
exercise. (We recognise that the OECD DAC Handbook mostly focuses on SSR in the 
context of stable or fragile states, but the framework remains relevant and it does also 
address post-conflict contexts).  
 
Finally, it is convenient (for the purpose of discussion) to divide the transition from 
conflict to peace-building and development into a number of phases. 
 
• Preparation and negotiation of a peace settlement (either negotiated or 
imposed by a victor or external intervention) 
• Peace agreement 
• Immediate post-conflict stabilisation 
• Post conflict recovery and peace and security-building 
• Longer term peace-building and development 
                                                 
15  We acknowledge many useful discussions with policy and practitioner experts on these issues, and 
earlier works, particularly those of the SIDDR; A. Schnabel and H-G Ehrhart (eds), Security Sector 
Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, UN University Press, New York, 2005; A. Bryden and H. 
Hanggi (eds), Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, LIT Verlag, Munster, 2005; M 
Brzoska, ‘Embedding DDR Programmes in Security Sector reconstruction’, in A. Bryden and H. 
Hanggi, op cit. 
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In practice, the processes of ending wars and establishing an effective peacebuilding 
process under a legitimate and relatively stable government are generally very messy. 
Distinctions between these phases are often unclear, and peace agreements break 
down or conflict re-emerges for a time. These phases are thus simply constructs to 
facilitate the mapping of DDR – SSR programme links. 
 
3.1 DDR – SSR links through the design and implementation process 
Both DDR and SSR programmes nominally go through several phases of a 
programme cycle: 
 
• Pre-planning and Needs assessments 
• Assessing and promoting a political and security context offering prospects for 
success 
• Programme planning and design 
• Developing ‘local ownership’ and national capacity 
• Implementing each phase of the programme 
• Monitoring, review and evaluation 
• Transition and exit strategy implementation 
 
In this subsection, the possible and actual linkages between SSR and DDR processes 
are identified and briefly discussed for each of these phases in a post-conflict context.  
 
Sequencing issues immediately arise. DDR and SSR programmes are usually distinct, 
starting at different times and operating over different time scales. Typically, 
international engagement with, and support for, SSR processes after conflicts has 
begun later than for DDR. But this has not always been the case; and (as noted in 
section 2) national SSR processes often informally begin as soon as there is a 
ceasefire or good prospect of a peace-agreement). DDR programmes typically are of 
relatively short duration (approximately three  years, with sometimes only ad hoc re-
integration programmes continuing later), while support for SSR programmes may 
well extend well beyond the post-conflict stabilisation phase and into longer term 
peace-building and development. 
 
Thus, possible linkages include interrelationships between the DDR and SSR 
programmes when they are at different stages of their ‘programme cycle’.  
 
3.1.1  Pre-planning and needs assessments 
At the first stage of programme development, there is a need to examine the situation 
in the relevant country or region, assess needs, and identify possible programme 
options and support roles. In relation to transitions from conflict, it is preferable if this 
is done while any peace agreement is being discussed and negotiated, since this 
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enables relevant provisions to be agreed within the peace agreement itself, and also 
timely initiation of required programmes after the peace settlement is agreed.  
 
The UN has a well-developed set of procedures for assessing and preparing for 
possible UN peace-support missions. Under the new UN ‘integrated mission’ 
approach, there is an integrated mission task force (IMTF) at UN HQ level, linked 
with an integrated mission planning team (IMPT) at country level. At the first stages, 
the priority is to make early assessments of the situation and the relevant needs, and 
identify possible options. 
 
In the past, there was a problem that initial assessments were conducted in a 
fragmented way, so that initial assessment teams may not have included an 
appropriate mix of experts and institutional representatives, resulting in un-integrated 
assessments and planning. This is now recognised to be bad practice, and the UN and 
other regional agencies (e.g. EU, NATO) concerned with post-conflict peace support 
strive to implement guidelines to ensure integrated and appropriately comprehensive 
assessment teams. 
 
Thus, it is now clear (as outlined in IDDRS16) that representatives from relevant DDR 
teams should be included in integrated initial assessments at the earliest stage. For UN 
operations, this would be co-ordinated by the relevant UN Resident Co-ordinator 
(RC) or Humanitarian Co-ordinator (HC), for example.  
 
Guidelines and practices are typically much less advanced for SSR processes. Specific 
examination of SSR needs and programme options have often been delayed until after 
other elements of a peace-support mission or DDR programme are relatively well-
advanced. In the context of the UN, this is partly due to its lack of explicit mandates 
or common approaches towards supporting SSR, as discussed above.  
 
However, it is increasingly widely recognised that it is important to address SSR 
issues at an early stage, so that assessments can be integrated into wider peace support 
strategies and programmes from the beginning, and so that parties to the conflict and 
peace process are encouraged to address them appropriately in the peace negotiations 
and agreements. 
 
In recent years, the UN (and other relevant multilateral or regional institutions such as 
the EU) has adopted guidelines to integrate experts on post-conflict police support 
into initial assessment teams. However, these have typically focussed on issues 
relevant to early deployment of relatively combat-capable police units (such as 
gendarmerie), with assessments of other police services, rule of law institutions, penal 
service etc, often being delayed until a later phase. This means that some elements of 
                                                 
16UN IDDRS, Chapter 3.10, ‘Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures’, at 
http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/03/#7. 
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SSR are increasingly integrated into early assessment teams, with others still 
excluded. There has been some progress to rectify this (note for example that the UK 
government’s guidelines for deployment of police officers to peace-support operations 
have provisions to avoid this risk17), but it remains patchy. 
 
In summary, it seems clear that there are important potential linkages between DDR 
and SSR initial assessment and pre-planning processes. In some cases, there have 
actually been such linkages, but these have often been rather partial or ad-hoc. The 
general significance of such links is: 
 
• To help to ensure the development of an overall assessment and strategy for 
external support for post-conflict security building, with DDR and SSR 
designed and implemented as parts of a coherent and integrated programme. 
 
• To encourage the conflict parties to address the linkages between DDR and 
SSR appropriately at an early stage, hopefully during the negotiations for a 
peace settlement.  
 
Where SSR assessments start after DDR programmes have been designed, there are 
also significant potential linkages: 
 
• SSR initial assessment teams should be able to make use of the earlier DDR 
assessments, and also of subsequent assessments and experience of DDR 
Teams. This is often done informally in practice, but could be strengthened by 
promoting better access to confidential assessments, and by ensuring that DDR 
assessments properly address relevant SSR issues and are aware of SSR 
priorities. 
 
• Initiation of locally-desired DDR programmes may be made conditional on the 
recipient governments announcing appropriate SSR plans and programmes. 
This was done in the DRC and Great Lakes, in the context of the MDRP, to 
some useful effect.18  
 
3.1.2  Promoting a conducive political and security context 
Both DDR and SSR processes and programmes require certain basic conditions before 
there are reasonable prospects of success.  
 
For DDR programmes, these include:  
 
• Commitment by all (or almost all) armed factions to the peace agreement; 
                                                 
17 For example, Peace Support Operations: information and guidance for UK police personnel, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, April 2007. 
18 MDRP Secretariat, “Position Paper: Linkages between DDR of ex-combatants and Security Sector 
Reform”, MDRP, October 2003, at http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/ssr-paper.pdf.  
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• Functioning command and control within the armed factions; 
• Cessation of armed violence between armed parties, at least in the regions 
where DDR is planned; 
• Substantial and relatively co-ordinated engagement by key external 
stakeholders, particularly if the peace settlement is negotiated (this is also 
important for DDR after victories, but some argue not necessarily essential). 
 
SSR programmes cover a wider range of types of objectives and activities, so the 
conditions for success are less easily summarised, including in post-conflict contexts. 
But they include: 
 
• Commitment by relevant and legitimate national or factional leaders, and 
prospects of wider public buy-in; 
• Virtual cessation or adequate geographical confinement of large-scale armed 
violence,  
• Legitimate and potentially sustainable SSR programme objectives; 
• Appropriate balance between seeming SSR priorities in the immediate post-
conflict stabilisation and longer term security and justice needs of wider 
population; 
• Engagement and reasonably coherent support of key external stakeholders; 
• Commitment by partner (beneficiary) governments to the normative priorities 
of SSR (as for example specified by OECD-DAC).   
  
In practice, there are potentially large overlaps and synergies between efforts to 
establish and promote the conditions for potentially effective DDR and SSR 
programmes. In many cases, the high-level influence that needs to be mobilised to 
promote conditions for successful post-conflict security-building programmes should 
integrate the concerns and priorities of both DDR and SSR, and also other related 
programmes (such as SALW control and arms management).  
 
Further, there are potentially important opportunities to use progress in elements of 
one programme to promote confidence and commitment to progress in the other. For 
example, progress on demobilisation of a rebel group might be linked with 
commitment to reform key government security forces, such as the army. For 
example, in Nepal it was clear that ‘classic’ DDR of the ‘Maoist’ rebel forces would 
not be possible without corresponding SSR processes involving the Nepal Army 
(withdrawal to barracks pending changes in command and accountability, and 
possible re-structuring).19 The design and implementation of the so-called 
‘comprehensive peace agreement’ in practice requires a complex combination and 
sequencing of elements of DDR, SSR and arms management programmes.  
 
                                                 
19 See S. Rynn and O. Greene: “DDR in Nepal’; DDR and Human Security Project mini case-study, 
July 2008, at www. http://www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk. 
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Moreover, where DDR or SSR programmes have already started, they may help to 
create the conditions for success for the other. This is not automatically the case. 
There are cases where the design and implementation of a DDR process has 
constrained SSR options in a way that for example empowered ‘spoilers’, limited 
wider public support and relevance, or created obstacles for effective or efficient 
provision of some security services.  
 
3.1.3  Programme planning and design 
After initial assessments have been carried out, and there are decisions to proceed 
with DDR or SSR programmes, the next phase of the programme cycle is to engage in 
the detailed design and planning of the programmes. The UN IDDRS elaborate on 
these processes in relation to DDR programmes, within the context of overall 
integrated mission planning. It elaborates various elements, including initial technical 
assessments; development of a strategy and policy framework; and development of a 
programme and operational framework.  
 
On SSR, the UN has developed some guidelines for designing and planning police 
and rule of law missions in the context of integrated post-conflict peace-support 
missions, which are presently developing relatively rapidly. However, as discussed 
above, for the immediate post-conflict stabilisation phase, these are often focussed on 
relatively narrow objectives to enable basic police and judicial support. The 
institutional reform objectives that are so central to SSR programmes are often 
marginalised, on the assumption that these do not become relevant until rather later in 
the peace-building process. However, elsewhere there are now relatively well 
elaborated guidelines on the processes of designing and planning SSR programmes, 
including in the OECD DAC Handbook, which can be adapted to the post-conflict 
context.   
 
Although many changes to security sector agencies and institutions take place in the 
immediate post-conflict context, SSR is in many ways intrinsically a longer term 
process than disarmament, demobilisation and re-insertion of ex-combatants (though 
re-integration process are also relatively long term). This is because they focus on 
institutional reforms, and on the processes required to develop the complex set of 
security services and governance and oversight bodies required to meet the long-term 
security needs of the country and all its citizens.  
 
For this reason, the OECD DAC Handbook emphasises that the quality of the process 
of designing and planning SSR is as important as the resulting programme design 
itself. It takes time to develop an appropriately comprehensive framework and plan 
for SSR with wide political and institutional support and buy-in. In principle this can 
be addressed through transitional SSR processes, but this in itself poses challenges. 
 
Some peace agreements specify an institutional framework for at least aspects of SSR, 
such as an army that integrates combatants from several factions, or a reformed or 
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decentralised policy service. In this context, it is legitimately possible and appropriate 
to start to embark on the implied SSR processes relatively quickly. Even in such 
contexts, however, complex judgements are required on how to sequence the 
programme, to provide appropriate scope for early review and adjustment as wider 
post-conflict SSR priorities are recognised and the voices and interests of armed 
faction leaders become less dominant. Parties dominating the negotiation of a peace 
agreement are often not the best ones to make these complex judgements.  
 
DDR teams have sometimes reportedly become impatient with the consultation and 
‘process’ orientation of good SSR planning. Often they come from a pre-dominantly 
military culture, where objectives, once specified, should be planned and implemented 
as quickly and efficiently as possible. SSR teams from the police and other sectors as 
well as development aid agencies have sometimes been equally guilty of this. 
Timeliness is a particularly important aspect of DDR programmes, so that ex-
combatants gain confidence in the process. 
 
A further institutional obstacle to co-ordinated SSR and DDR programme design and 
planning, at least at present, is that SSR programmes tend to be supported through 
bilateral programmes, whereas DDR programmes are normally an intrinsic element of 
UN peace-support missions and able to draw upon UN assessed budget contributions. 
This adds to institutional obstacles to co-ordination. We return to this below.  
 
There are important shared programme objectives where DDR and SSR linkages 
could be critical. These include: 
 
• Clarifying the consequences of disarmament and demobilisation of armed 
factions for security of the communities and people in the areas in which they 
operate – normally an effective combination of DDR and SSR will help local 
people, but there is the risk that DDR may be removing important security 
protection without replacing it with alternatives.  
 
• Ensuring that packages and options for demobilised ex-combatants and their 
dependents take appropriate account of employment opportunities in reformed 
security sector institutions (not only the defence forces, but also other 
institutions, including the police and border guards).  
 
• Developing an integrated approach linking DDR, SSR and civilian arms 
collection/management to engage with, and limit security risks from, criminal 
armed groups or gangs in the post-conflict situation.   
 
• Ensuring a closely co-ordinated approach towards enduring command 
structures amongst de-mobilised groups.  IDDRS advises that command 
structures should be dismantled wherever possible, but in practice they have 
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often proved enduring even amongst ex-combatants, and vulnerable people 
look to their old unit commanders for guidance or protection. This is an issue 
of common concern for SSR and DDR.  
 
• Ensuring a closely co-ordinated approach towards decisions on extent, timing 
and character of demobilisation or integration into on-going defence forces 
and wider SSR. Experience in East Timor and several other countries 
demonstrates the importance of ensuring that such processes do not create 
undue risks of resurgence of division or conflict with different security sector 
units taking different sides. 
   
• Promoting a consistent and effective approach towards transitional justice issues. 
As will be discussed in section 4, DDR programmes have rarely taken deep 
account of issues of transitional justice, except where constraints are explicitly 
built into the terms of the peace agreement or by indictment by the ICC (as for the 
demobilisation of the LRA in Northern Uganda). DDR vetting and interview 
procedures associated with determining programme eligibility and needs do not 
generally also include vetting for possible war crimes.20 The connections between 
SSR and transitional justice have often been more profound: for example, vetting 
for possible war crimes became an important factor in Kosovo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia, sometime acting as a major constraint on SSR processes 
to establish or reform police services. Similarly, it is important to achieve useful 
synergies between the development of special institutions to try those accused of 
war crimes and wider criminal justice institutions. For both SSR and DDR, it can 
be difficult to establish the appropriate balance between programme and 
transitional justice priorities, but their overlapping aims and target groups imply 
that a common approach is likely to be important.  
 
• Personnel and Institutions– when DDR and SSR are managed at the national level 
with financial and technical support from international donors (such as in MDRP 
countries) – in many instances personnel and institutions responsible for design, 
implementation, monitoring of DDR are located within a wider security sector 
institutional framework. National capacity-building to enhance implementation of 
DDR programmes, such as the development of National DDR Commissions, 
should take wider SSR concerns into account, and vice versa. For example, 
capacities developed to implement short-tem DDR should be linked with enduring 
security sector management institutions, to help to ensure enduring contributions 
to their capacity as DDR programmes wind down.  
 
                                                 
20 ITCJ, Project on DDR and Transitional Justice; provisional findings (author interviews with ITCJ 
project researchers, New York, 2007)  
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In conclusion, we can summarise the significant linkages between planning and 
designing DDR and SSR programmes in post-conflict contexts. The most important 
elements include: 
 
• The need to ensure that DDR programmes are coherent with overall SSR 
priorities and strategies, so that they do not unduly constrain or undermine 
longer term SSR goals (and sometimes vice versa); 
 
• The need to examine systematically opportunities and programming 
implications for designing an integrated programme for post-conflict security 
building, in which elements of DDR and SSR programmes are integrated or 
sequenced in the interests of wider peace-building; 
 
• The opportunities for SSR and DDR planning teams to pool or exchange 
resources in the consultations that are involved in programme design and 
development. This could include joint consultations. Even if implementation 
of SSR programmes is likely to be delayed, there could be real mutual benefits 
in having SSR experts participate in consultations relating to DDR programme 
planning. 
 
• Co-ordination to ensure an appropriately consistent or common approach to 
linked programmes or issues, such as SALW control or transitional justice. 
 
3.1.4  Developing local ownership and national capacity 
Both DDR and SSR guidelines emphasise the importance of ‘local ownership’ of 
programmes, and of developing national capacity to contribute to their design, 
implementation and review. In practice, performance of both SSR and DDR 
programmes against these criteria are often poor.  
 
Understandings and priorities for ‘local ownership’ can often be confused or 
contested, particularly in a post-conflict context in which social and political divisions 
remain potent and institutions to ensure effective democratic or community 
representation are highly imperfect. Similarly, in war-torn developing societies, 
national capacities to contribute to the design and implementation of complex 
security-building programmes are often weak, vulnerable to capture by special 
interests, or tainted by conflict. 21 
 
In this context, the perceived urgent need to achieve substantial DDR or embark on 
urgent changes to key security institutions (such as the military or police) can easily 
take priority over the complex challenges of securing meaningful local ownership or 
national capacity building. This is in many ways understandable. However, such an 
                                                 
21 See, for example, L. Nathan, “No Ownership, No Commitment: a Guide to Local Ownership of 
Security Sector Reform”, University of Birmingham, (2nd Edition), October 2007. 
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approach carries real risks, and the balance needs to be struck carefully according to 
the specific circumstances at the time. 
 
In this context, there are important possible synergies and pooling of scarce resources 
between DDR and SSR programmes to promote local ownership and build relevant 
national capacity. 
  
• Co-ordinate, or pool resources, to enable adequate local engagement in the 
pre-planning, needs assessment, planning and design of both DDR and SSR 
programmes. In the immediate post-conflict period, it may not be practical 
initially to develop meaningful local ownership – but it is important that a 
strategy is in place enabling this to develop over time, and DDR-SSR links 
could facilitate this.   
 
• Consultation to develop beneficiary or wider community input and buy-in to 
elements of demobilisation, re-insertion or re-integration programmes could be 
combined with consultations relating to SSR programmes, and vice versa. 
Between them the SSR and DDR could combine to develop local mechanisms 
to facilitate community inputs. 
 
• There are examples of National DDR Commissions being established purely 
for the purposes of DDR, when they could be designed also to contribute to 
national capacity for SSR and for wider and longer-term security-building 
programmes. In many countries, the effectiveness and sustainability of the 
National DDR Commissions has been seriously undermined by lack of 
resources. So any combination of responsibilities for SSR would need to be 
assigned and supported in a way that took account of this. 
 
• Programmes could pool resources to support the development of relevant 
national legal frameworks, material and logistic support; training programmes 
for national staff; and implementation and financial management (as listed for 
example in IDDRS). 
 
In practice, it appears that concerned programme managers have sometimes co-
operated informally to achieve such synergies – for example in Sierra Leone - but that 
formal institutional arrangements have often obstructed rather than facilitated this.  
 
3.1.5 SSR-DDR links during programme implementation 
In principle, the links between DDR and SSR during design and planning phases are 
all relevant during programme implementation. More specifically, the linkages exist 
in at least three different categories:  
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• Pooling resources or making use of the other programme’s expertise, resources 
and implementation capacities; 
 
• improving implementation by gaining benefits from the outputs or outcomes 
of the other programme; and  
 
• co-ordinating joint efforts to influence overall peace-building and PCR 
strategies and resource allocation – nationally and internationally. 
 
In relation to disarmament, DDR programmes require specific procedures and 
arrangements customised to the disarmament of identified ex-combatants. In practice, 
however, implementation of the disarmament component of DDR has often been 
conducted in a way that has strong links with aspects of SSR and arms management 
programmes. For example, the ways in which a DDR programme manages and 
disposes of collected arms will have implications for SSR and arms management 
programmes to promote secure stockpile management and disposal of surplus stocks 
of remaining military, police and other armed security institutions. Record-keeping 
and accounting systems established for DDR could contribute to enduring national 
capacities in this area. Surveys of weapons possession relevant to the setting criteria 
for weapons hand-in could usefully link or combine with similar surveys done to 
assess community security needs or develop civilian arms management programmes.  
 
In relation to demobilisation, there is a range of important links with SSR. Most 
prominent of these are links between decisions on demobilisation and processes of 
down-sizing and restructuring the military, police or border-guard services. Detailed 
implementation strategies are important as well as connections at the strategic level. 
Reportedly, demobilisation of Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan was 
implemented in a way that particularly focussed on more experienced and capable 
fighting units, to contribute to the process of preventing them dominating the re-
constituted national army.22 It remains debateable whether this was a wise approach, 
but it certainly provides an important illustration of SSR-DDR links at the level of 
detailed implementation. It is also important to note links with transitional justice 
here, where amnesty has been granted to ex-combatants without due account of the 
needs or opportunities for truth and reconciliation processes and mechanisms. 
 
SSR issues may be linked with choices between demobilisation using semi-permanent 
demobilisation sites (cantonment) and a so-called ‘mobile’ approach of demobilising 
where groups of ex-combatants are gathered. Such decisions may substantially affect 
the implications for local community security after demobilisation, for example, and 
the priorities for SSR and justice. The regional dimensions of these peace and conflict 
processes add additional challenges here, as experienced for example in the Great 
                                                 
22 Interview with Prof Isezaki, Co-ordinator DDR Afghanistan, 2002-4, Tokyo, March 2007 
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Lakes region where combatant and ‘ex-combatant’ groups from one country have 
been a concern in neighbouring states.  
 
In a further example, the processes of registering and processing ex-combatants and 
associated dependents including women and girls, for DDR could contribute to 
vetting for possible employment in police or other security services, and could 
provide a context in which information provision and awareness raising on future SSR 
consultation and plans could be promoted. In this way, DDR could contribute to 
cross-cutting issues for SSR (such as gender mainstreaming). In this area, links with 
transitional justice concerns become strategic: both DDR and SSR would need to take 
a consistent approach, to reduce risks of community rejection of elements of newly 
formed security services.  
 
On reinsertion, the process of discharge and the character of the discharge package 
has to be designed with due awareness for wider security and arms management 
issues, with indirect implications for SSR. Re-insertion of ex-combatants could 
usefully be co-ordinated with community safety and security initiatives, for example, 
not least to build mutual confidence between returning ex-combatants and recipient 
communities that their insecurities are being addressed. Similarly, DDR and SSR joint 
concerns relating to command structures being informally or formally maintained 
during reinsertion imply a co-ordinated approach. In northern Uganda, for example, 
returning LRA groups have typically almost been encouraged to retain their links with 
old commanding officers. In other areas (such as the Kivus in DRC), such enduring 
links are a matter of concern. 
 
As discussed in Thematic Paper No 4, there are also important links here between re-
insertion of ex-combatant and their dependents and IDP return packages. Even if there 
are good reasons for distinctive re-insertion packages and procedures for ex-
combatants and their dependents (compared with other displaced people), it is 
important that this is explained and co-ordinated.  
 
The characteristics and effectiveness of Re-integration programmes has wide-
ranging and complex implications for security, and thus indirectly for SSR. More 
specifically, community safety, security and access to justice initiatives within an SSR 
programme could benefit from careful information exchange if not co-ordination with 
DDR programme officers, both to address the specific needs of returned ex-
combatants and there dependents and those of the community as a whole. There is, for 
example, evidence that returned ex-combatants at low-levels in their previous 
command structures can be particularly vulnerable to exploitation and recruitment by 
local elites or criminals.  
 
Pooling resources between DDR and SSR to track ex-combatants after their return to 
civilian life may make sense for both programmes, and is currently relatively 
neglected. It appears that many ex-combatants and their dependents gravitate back 
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towards towns and cities after re-insertion, with important implications for re-
integration support programmes as well as SSR (for example in relation to regulation 
of private security companies or promoting safer spaces in their new environments.  
 
From an SSR perspective, there are numerous ways in which SSR processes could 
potentially link with or contribute to DDR. Obviously progress towards reforming and 
developing security and access to justice for communities will both contribute to the 
confidence of demobilised ex-combatants and their dependents and facilitate re-
integration processes. An illustration of a more direct linkage is that progress in 
developing mechanisms and institutions for security sector governance and oversight 
could directly improve national capacity to contribute to national engagement with 
elements of DDR programmes.  
 
3.1.6  Monitoring, review and evaluation 
Good practice guidelines for the DDR and for SSR both emphasise the importance of 
regular monitoring and review of progress, and of evaluation of programmes at 
milestone points or as they come to an end. Regular monitoring and review during 
programme implementation is critical, in order to identify and address emerging 
problems or opportunities in a timely way. Evaluation is important not only to ensure 
appropriate accountability, but also to contribute to wider lesson learning and 
refinement of guidelines.  
 
In practice, monitoring, review and evaluation processes have been ad-hoc or 
inadequate, in numerous post-conflict DDR and SSR programmes. Where they have 
been conducted their findings are often deemed ‘sensitive’, and thus not properly 
shared. Mechanisms for wider institutional learning and contributing to revision of 
guidelines and training for practitioners are often inadequate. 
 
These are shared problems for both DDR and SSR programmes, and indeed for many 
other post-conflict programmes. There may be advantages in some pooling of 
resources for monitoring, review and evaluation between DDR and SSR programmes: 
although specific programme evaluations will require distinct elements, the overlaps 
between programmes, their target groups and stakeholders, and their objectives should 
imply areas where joint monitoring and review could be useful. Further, monitoring 
and review processes for each programme could, with appropriate co-ordination and 
consultation, usefully contribute to the other’s effectiveness. Responses to emerging 
problems with demobilisation or disarmament, for example, might require SSR 
measures as well as adjustments to the DDR programme itself.   
 
3.1.7  Transition to longer-term peace-building and development, and ‘exit strategies’ 
SSR processes are best planned and implemented as long term processes, continuing 
from the immediate post-conflict recovery period into the longer term. DDR 
programmes are normally of relatively short duration and end as the post-conflict 
stabilisation and recovery phase is completed. Issues and priorities relating to linkages 
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between DDR programmes and longer-term peace building and development are 
examined in Working Paper 5 in this series. The question here is whether there are 
significant SSR-DDR linkages. 
 
Experience indicates that there are some links, though further research is required to 
assess their likely significance. For example: 
 
• Some of the capabilities, staff, procedures and institutions developed in the 
course of the DDR project may have continuing value for SSR and arms 
management processes, yet mechanisms to enabling effective transfer are 
mostly lacking. 
 
• There may be value in adapting some of the mechanisms and expertise 
developed in a successful DDR programme to contribute to the dismantlement 
of criminal or other armed groups that emerge after the conflict has ended – 
linking with policing and rule of law. 
 
• Longer-term re-integration programmes could be usefully linked with 
community safety and security programmes or access to justice reforms that 
are broadly located within the remit of SSR.  
 
• Continuation of external support for SSR might be useful in facilitating exit 
strategies for UN or other international DDR teams, by providing a framework 
for continuing support for any elements of continuing value to the country 
concerned. 
3.2 SSR-DDR links and cross cutting issues 
DDR and SSR programmes both have to engage effectively with similar cross-cutting 
issues in the post-conflict context. These cross-cutting issues include specific issues 
and requirements relating to women (whether ex-combatants, dependents or other), 
gender, youth, children, cross-border controls and movements, and transitional justice. 
Other cross-cutting issues relating to linkages with non-security post-conflict 
programmes to address the return of displaced people, food aid, health, education of 
infrastructure are addressed in Working Paper 4 of this series, and are thus not 
considered here. 
 
Each of these cross-cutting issues poses some specific challenges and issues for DDR 
programmes. The IDDRS includes specific chapters to assist DDR practitioners and 
policy-makers to identify and appropriately respond to almost all of the cross-cutting 
issues noted above. Similarly, SSR processes should engage effectively with the same 
issues, though on a different basis. 
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In this context, it is important to ensure reasonable coherence and co-ordination of 
responses. Surveys and assessments of the particular concerns and needs of women, 
youth and children passing through the DDR programmes could usefully be informed 
by SSR assessments of the wider concerns and security and justice needs of these 
people across the country and in particular in the communities to which ex-
combatants are to be re-inserted.  
 
Measures to address the particular concerns and needs of these groups of ex-
combatants could include SSR programmes. For example, women and girls who have 
actually been directly involved in the conflict as combatants typically find re-
integration particularly difficult, and some could benefit from SSR programmes 
specifically designed to provide opportunities for female recruitment. Programmes 
within SSR to promote community policing and local justice mechanisms (including 
through traditional/customary authorities) could usefully focus on raising awareness 
and capabilities for engaging with youth, facilitating the re-integration of young ex-
combatants.  
 
Post-conflict peace-support missions continue to pay inadequate attention to cross-
border and transnational issues, as evidenced for example by the damaging 
inconsistency between DDR programmes in the Mano River sub-region and the lack 
of co-ordination between SSR and peace-support missions in the Western Balkans. 
SSR programmes to enhance regulation and control of border regions could contribute 
to monitoring and management of cross-border movements relevant to DDR 
programmes. By combining forces, SSR and DDR teams might be better able to 
ensure that senior national and international authorities engage with cross-border 
issues more regularly and determinedly.  
 
The DDR and SSR linkages with transitional justice processes are particularly 
complex and worthy of investigation. In principle, programmes to promote 
transitional justice and challenge impunity from war crimes could be included within 
the scope of SSR. In practice, the international organisations, experts and programmes 
which address transitional justice and ‘truth and reconciliation’ processes have 
developed separately from the wider SSR community, and typically have different 
priorities.23  
 
While transitional justice programmes focus on addressing crimes and grievances 
arising from past conflict or oppression, SSR tends to focus more on reforms to 
enhance provision of security and justice to communities and people during and after 
the transition. Special War Crimes tribunals or Truth and Justice Commissions are 
usually customised for their specific purpose. Though they aim to promote 
reconciliation and confidence-building, as well as rule of law, they are rarely designed 
                                                 
23 See for example, O. Greene and D. Henriksen: Panel presentations made at ITCJ Conference on SSR 
and Transitional Justice, February 2007, New York.  
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to contribute to wider SSR institution building, as evidenced for example by 
experience in Sierra Leone, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.  
 
Similarly, emerging findings from case study research by ICTJ indicate that DDR 
programmes have rarely taken systematic account of transitional justice issues.24 In 
some case, such as Colombia, the demobilisation package has involved amnesties and 
protection from prosecution for past crimes that many find hard to accept. More 
generally, international DDR guidelines emphasise that demobilisation packages 
should not extend amnesties for serious war crimes. In practice, however, DDR 
practitioners continue to tend to focus on short-term peace and security priorities 
rather than those of transitional justice. 
 
An example of a key operational linkage between DDR and SSR programmes on the 
one hand and transitional justice on the other is provided by vetting procedures. 
Where vetting has been neglected in recruitment for reformed security institutions in 
post-conflict context, the results have sometimes been disastrous (e.g. police 
recruitment in post-intervention Iraq and Afghanistan) and always difficult. On the 
other hand, effective vetting of existing post-holders and new recruits can lead to long 
delays in SSR programmes. Meanwhile DDR programmes generally include 
registration and interview processes that could be relevant for this processes. Linkages 
in these areas between DDR, SSR and transitional justice are extremely sensitive, and 
have to be handled carefully. But they exist, and could be better managed.  
 
3.3 Initial summary 
There are many actual and potential links between DDR and SSR programmes in 
post-conflict contexts. Many fall within the framework of ensuring that DDR and SSR 
programmes are well-co-ordinated within an integrated overall programme of post-
conflict security building. Many of the specific links between DDR and SSR appear 
indirect or secondary in programming terms. However, a number of direct and 
significant links to appear to have been identified. These include: 
 
• linked assessment, planning, monitoring and review processes;   
 
• opportunities to pool resources and combine or sequence different elements of 
SSR and DDR to mutual benefit during the design or implementation phases 
as part of a customised security-building programme (for example, in relation 
to defence reform, various aspects of policing, and  
 
• reducing risks from emerging armed groups after conflicts.  
 
 
                                                 
24 ITCJ, New York, 2007. 
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4. DDR and SSR Links: Sectoral Linkages and Country Experiences  
 
After the initial mapping of potentially important linkages between DDR and SSR 
programmes in section 3, this section examines some lessons and experiences from 
selected countries, and then discusses linkages in relation to specific sectors for SSR – 
focussing particularly on the types of links that emerged from section 3 as potentially 
important.   
4.1 SSR-DDR sectoral linkages 
The security sector includes a wide range of different institutions covering a range of 
sectors. As outlined in section 2, these include: democratic security governance and 
oversight; armed forces and military, policing, intelligence and security services, 
judicial services, penal sector, border management and control. Private Security 
Companies (PSCs) and civil society are also important sectors of society relevant to 
SSR. These are each separately addressed in the OECD DAC Handbook. It is useful 
briefly to review some sector specific linkages with DDR processes. 
 
4.1.1  Governance and oversight 
Promoting good, democratic, governance and oversight for the security sector is a 
high priority for SSR. For example, OECD DAC policy and guidance on SSR lists 
four ‘overarching objectives’ for programmes, the first of which is ‘establishment of 
effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system’.25 Despite 
this, the record of SSR programmes in enhancing civilian oversight of security forces 
and introducing greater accountability for their actions in law, policy and practice has 
been extremely patchy, and has often been neglected in comparison the programmes 
to train, equip and professionalize run-down security forces.  
 
There are often important windows of opportunity after peace agreements to establish 
principles and procedures to contribute to this objective, although it must generally be 
a long-term process. There may be possibilities for DDR programmes to contribute to 
this process, and also to benefit from some SSR-related initiatives in this sphere. 
 
Some linkage issues are essentially to avoid actions in DDR programmes that might 
undermine SSR initiatives in this area, and take opportunities to bolster them. Thus, 
DDR programme managers and decision-makers should aim to take due account of 
new or emergent government or democratic institutions where relevant. This may be 
in relation to needs assessments, programme planning or design, implementation and 
review. In practice, this may be frustrating, since transitional governments and 
emergent political parties and parliaments are prone to symbolic debates, which may 
                                                 
25 Others are: improved delivery of security and justice services; development of local leadership and 
ownership of the reform process; sustainability of justice and security service delivery. DAC policy 
also espouses the following ‘principles’ during SSR: ‘locally owned and based on democratic norms’, 
‘…greater civilian involvement and oversight…’, ‘Developed adhering to basic governance principles 
such as transparency and accountability’, and ‘Implemented through clear processes and policies’. 
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not be useful. However, it is important to try, as a contribution to wider peace-
building and also to developing wider ‘local ownership’ of DDR and related 
programmes. Further, efforts should be made to ensure that local institutions to 
manage and oversee DDR programmes, such as national DDR commissions are 
appropriately accountable and open to local stakeholders and parliaments, as well as 
to the executive branch of the new post-conflict government.   
 
There may be other possible linkages with DDR in this respect. An important but 
relatively neglected area relates to the transition of conflict parties and combatants 
towards active civilian engagement in democratic politics. Case studies have 
demonstrated that many ex-combatants often remain relatively politicised and 
interested in fulfilling leadership or representational functions as they return to 
civilian life. For example, many UNITA ex-combatants in Angola appear to have re-
integrated into their communities and adopted community or political leadership 
roles.26 More widely, a key strategic goal for peace-building is to enable successful 
transition of rebel groups or conflict parties into legitimate and peaceful political 
movements and parties.27   
 
This is this an important aspect of DDR processes, which could usefully be taken into 
account in re-insertion and re-integration measures in DDR programmes. The DDR 
programme in Nepal perhaps illustrates ways in which conflict parties can 
instrumentally use DDR in undesirable ways: in this case, most senior or experienced 
Maoist ex-combatants were demobilised before the DDR programme officially began 
(and replaced with new raw recruits to ensure that overall re-insertion benefits were 
not diminished), so that they could act unimpeded as political cadre for continuing 
struggle.28 However, there may be many more positive opportunities. Re-integrated 
ex-combatants contribute to a pool of civilians with detailed knowledge of security 
sector issues that can help to develop more effective civilian management and 
oversight through participation in relevant government ministries, parliamentary 
committees, NGOs or media outlets.  
 
A related question of managing and overseeing reform programmes such as DDR and 
SSR is also important. Arrangements for managing and overseeing SSR programmes 
are often inadequate. 29 Similarly, although greater attention has been paid to 
developing adequate management arrangements in DDR due to the high-pressured 
environments they take place in, most programmes have exhibited significant failings 
in this area (e.g. Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone). There is a prima facie case for 
developing common and possibly linked approaches towards management and 
                                                 
26 J. Gomes Porto, I. Parson and C. Alden, From Soldiers to Citizens: the social, economic, and 
political re-integration of UNITA ex-combatants in Angola, Ashgate, 2007.  
27 As examined, for example, in J. de Zeeuw (ed), From Soldiers to Politicians: transforming rebel 
movements after civil war, Lynne Reinner, London 2008.  
28 See S. Rynn and O. Greene, op. cit. 
29 See, for example, G. Peake and A. Hills (ed), Civil Wars, special issue, 2007. 
31 
 
oversight arrangements for DDR and SSR. Using evidence from case studies and a 
wider literature review, a brief overview of some key issues arising in relation to the 
management and oversight of DDR and SSR programmes is outlined below. 
 
It is well-established that national commissions have a central role to play in DDR, 
but there is a need to ensure that they do not neglect community participation. It is 
sometimes asserted that externals do not fully comprehend local DDR contexts, but 
similar observations apply to national commissions who sometimes disregard local 
perspectives and focus more on the national picture. They are also often over-
stretched. This suggests there could usefully be formal mechanisms to strengthen 
links and co-ordination between the two so that human security risks and 
vulnerabilities can be identified.   
 
Some significant issues emerge from this brief review of governance and oversight 
arrangements for DDR and SSR programmes, which are highlighted below. 
 
Local ownership 
• The objective of ‘establishment of effective governance, oversight and 
accountability’ implies or requires local ownership, for it is hard for an SSR 
programme to contribute to enhanced oversight of a country’s security system 
without itself being well managed or overseen. There is therefore a clear 
relationship and interdependence between ownership and oversight. 
• For their part, recipient or partner governments have committed to “exercise 
effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-
ordinate development actions” under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.30 
 
Capacity issues 
• National government institutions need to develop the capacity to assess, plan and 
direct the reform SSR processes. The OECD DAC IF-SSR Handbook notes there 
is commonly a need to support capacity development in at least four areas: 
strategic planning and policy making, budgetary processes, management and 
monitoring, review and evaluation. Guidance on ‘strengthening national capacity’ 
is offered, as is advice on ‘managing international assistance programmes’. 
• The requisite infrastructure necessary for the range of DDR activities are often 
weak and poorly institutionalised. Government ministries and institutions may be 
under-funded and poorly equipped and their capacity to deliver essential public 
services is will likely have been severely reduced during conflict. Examples of this 
are to be found in several case studies, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and 
Uganda. 
                                                 
30 See: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration. Donors are similarly committed to “…respect 
partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.” (OECD, 2005). 
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• There is a clear tension here, since the capacity of national governments and civil 
societies is likely to be limited in countries emerging from conflict, SSR and to 
some extent DDR programmes have both to ensure adequate participation of 
national governments and civil societies in the management and oversight of 
programmes, and create the preconditions for adequate participation through 
capacity building.  
 
Donor – Recipient government partnership 
• Attention needs to be paid to issues of co-ordination at the ‘supply end’, between 
those who support DDR and SSR such as donors and multilaterals. This requires a 
lead agency, which often takes time to establish. The record is patchy and almost 
all post-conflict security building efforts have had failures of coordination and 
leadership. The models and institutional arrangements donors and multilateral 
agencies have for delivering support to DDR or SSR programmes have varied 
widely.  
 
 
4.1.2  Military or defence reform 
The sectoral links between DDR and SSR are most direct and obvious in relation to 
reform of armed forces. All substantial reforms of the armed forces typically involve 
restructuring and redundancy or transfer of significant numbers of armed forces 
personnel. During the last 15 – 20 years, most developing countries have had to 
engage in downsizing the military, which has often proved to be a major and difficult 
issue. Demobilisation and re-integration of armed forces personnel is therefore a 
central element of most defence reform. After conflicts, as rival forces are reconciled 
and partially combined, such reform can lead to at least temporary increases in 
security force sizes, as the new state aims to integrate ex-rebels while retaining most 
of its existing forces.  
 
DDR programmes are designed to manage such processes in the special and 
particularly sensitive context of war termination and implementing peace-agreements. 
But they are always implemented in the context of wider processes or reform and 
restructuring of armed forces in the country. Depending of the particular context and 
the nature of the peace settlement, some armed groups are almost entirely 
disarmament and demobilised, normally with national or international security 
guarantees. Others are to be integrated into a unified national army and security 
system. These are SSR processes that not only provide a strategic framework for DDR 
programmes but also affected the details of its design and implementation.  
 
4.1.3  Policing 
Defence reform is generally closely linked to police reform in many stable or fragile 
developing or transitional states. After reviews of their security needs, many countries 
have recognised over the last 20 years that they combine an oversized army with 
inadequate policing services. This is true in peace-time and even truer as wars come to 
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an end, and the need for effective police services becomes a priority. SSR often 
involves a rebalancing, in which the army withdraws from internal policing functions 
while the police institutions are established as independent institutions requiring 
substantial institutional reform and capacity-building.  
 
Policing is increasingly recognised to be a priority in post-conflict security and peace-
building processes. The UN IDDRS devotes a chapter to clarifying how UN Police 
roles, and wider policing reform can contribute to re-integration processes by 
enhancing community safety and security. However, this linkage tends to be 
downplayed in relation to the demobilisation element of DDR, which focuses on the 
immediate challenges of demobilisation of ex-combatants who are not to be integrated 
into future defence forces.  
 
There are good reasons for keeping demobilisation in DDR separate from police 
recruitment in post-conflict setting. The UN IDDRS advises DDR practitioners to 
exercise extreme caution. Taking to arms in a conflict is not an obvious indication of 
an aptitude for professional policing, and integrating ex-combatants into the police 
force risks increasing tensions (particularly when one recalls that vetting procedures 
and transitional justice measures are incomplete or worse).  
 
The incorporation of ex-combatants into internal security institutions such as the 
police or private security firms as opposed to the military obviously poses unique 
challenges. Provision of public security is in some respects more complex than 
external security: it requires coordination between criminal justice institutions such as 
the police, judiciary, corrections and perhaps related agencies tasked with intelligence 
gathering, civil emergencies and border control. Each of these may embrace different 
philosophies and have its own ways of working, with the judiciary in particular 
performing an important free-standing role in safeguarding the rule of law 
independently of politics. 
 
Having noted this, however, there is a case for this approach to be reviewed on a case 
by case basis. Standards of recruitment practices of police in post-conflict societies 
are often very low in any case. While establishing links between DDR and police 
recruitment may increase political risks for the DDR programme, it might in practice 
in some contexts help to improve de facto police recruitment procedures. There is a 
case for developing closer and more systematic links between police reform and DDR 
programmes in some contexts. Vetting and screening processes for ex-combatants to 
address transitional justice concerns could at least inform (with careful safeguards) 
similar processes in police recruitment, as discussed above, and at best reduce 
likelihood of creating tensions between communities and future civilian security 
providers. In countries where women are poorly represented in police services, and 
where women ex-combatants find it hard to re-integrate, such links may become an 
element in gender mainstreaming in SSR.  
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These arguments are explored below using examples drawn mainly from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo and Timor Leste, but in addition Afghanistan, 
Haiti, Iraq and Liberia. Each location has seen deliberate attempts to merge former 
combatants into police structures. In Bosnia and Kosovo, there is also some evidence 
of the unintended effects between DDR (or demobilization) and a burgeoning private 
security industry. No definitive conclusions are drawn on the basis of these cases, but 
they do suggest a number of considerations to be applied when attempting to link 
DDR and SSR in this way. A particular focus is placed on issues around vetting new 
recruits (a tool more commonly used for transitional justice but which is among the 
most important for DDR-SSR linkages) and the implications for the effective rule of 
law of such measures.  
 
Vetting, i.e. the investigation of the background of individual post-holders or 
applicants for public sector employment, is an important tool in preventing the 
improper employment of undesirables in security bodies.31 It is sometimes claimed 
that many problems associated with the political foundations of security sector 
institutions could be avoided with improved vetting procedures. Vetting (like 
lustration) is certainly one way of introducing accountability for past acts in post-
conflict settings, and preventing human rights violators from becoming too entrenched 
in the security system. Sanctions designed to ensure this does not occur might include 
forced retirement, dismissal, or a bar on entry to particular jobs or organizations. 
Kosovo, Haiti, Liberia, Timor Leste and Bosnia have all seen internationally-led 
public sector vetting processes in recent years. 
 
The different approaches to vetting that have been used in each of these cases are not 
examined in detail here, and there is much to be said about the different drivers, 
criteria, sanctions and standards that may be applied.32 While other priorities will also 
be relevant, including short-term law and order considerations and the need to find 
employment for ex-combatants, the focus below is on the implications that the 
integration of ex-combatants has for the rule of law. It is arguable that in judging the 
success or failure of the reintegration of ex-combatants into police services or the 
private security industry, the likely impact on the rule of law and the implications for 
the development of cohesive, accountable and effective security institutions are 
paramount considerations. 
 
Finally, it is also important to note the risks related to auxiliary security forces. For 
example in many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, figures relating to 
absorption of ex-combatants into national security services look radically different 
when auxiliary forces (e.g.. Anti-Stock Theft Units in Uganda) are included.  
                                                 
31 A key reference document is ‘Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: Operational 
Guidelines’, ICTJ/UNDP/OHCHR.  
32 For a more detailed treatment see, Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, (eds), Justice as 
Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, SSRC, 2007, at 
http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/books/2007/05/08/justice-as-prevention/. 
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4.1.4  Border and coastal management and control 
In principle, SSR processes relating to establishment and capacity-building of border-
guards and coast-guards could be linked usefully to DDR in similar ways to policing. 
More widely, improved management of border regions is often a critical issue in 
preventing further conflict and facilitating appropriate re-integration of ex-combatants 
into communities in border areas. Inappropriate or corrupt border controls, and bad 
performance of security sector and development processes in wider border areas is 
often a key contributor to alienation and impoverishment. 
 
DDR programmes involving demobilisation of ex-combatants in border regions may 
be useful sources of information to contribute to SSR assessment and priorities in 
these regions. Too often, SSR focuses on central or capital city institutions in the 
immediate post-conflict context, to the relative neglect of poorer and more insecure 
border areas. Links with DDR programmes may help to increase capacity to rectify 
this.  
 
4.1.5  Justice and penal systems 
The development of systems to enhance access to justice is a high priority in post-
conflict countries. Efforts to reform and build capacity of the judiciary and wider 
criminal justice system have become a prominent part of UN integrated missions, for 
example, though a complex and difficult one.33 The importance of developing an 
approach that also integrates ‘traditional’ justice and dispute resolution mechanisms 
has become widely recognised. So too has the importance of redressing past neglect 
of penal services in this context.  
 
Links between DDR and SSR appear to be relatively indirect in this sector, however. 
The main links appear to relate to re-insertion and re-integration processes. All 
returnees after conflict, including ex-combatants and their dependents, face relative 
high risks that others have taken possession of their property or other resources. In 
this context, ensuring adequate dispute resolution mechanisms is a priority to enable 
successful and just re-integration and reduce risks o local conflicts.  
 
4.1.6  Transitional justice  
Here we briefly return to a discussion of transitional justice and DDR links, building 
on the discussion in section 3. 
 
Transitional justice focuses on the question of how societies in transition from conflict 
or authoritarian rule address a history of gross human rights abuses or war crimes. 
These may include torture, summary executions, forced disappearances, slavery, 
enforced arbitrary detention, as well as ‘international crimes’ such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and serious violations of humanitarian law. Transitional justice 
focuses on such past crimes, and is an umbrella term covering the range of approaches 
                                                 
33 See, for example, discussion in Hanggi and Scherrer (2007), op cit. 
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that societies may use to contribute to a sense of justice, civic trust, and reconciliation 
relating to such crimes and to reduce impunity. Important approaches towards 
transitional justice include: prosecutions before national or international courts; truth-
seeking commissions and initiatives; reparations, and institutional reforms. 34  
 
Both DDR and SSR have substantial potential links with transitional justice (TJ), 
some of which were identified in previous sections. As already noted, in principle TJ 
could be considered to be part of SSR, but in practice it has evolved as a distinct 
community and issue area.  
 
At the heart of DDR programmes lies an issue relating of transitional justice: is it 
appropriate or right to focus much attention and resources on the needs of (ex-) 
combatants and their dependents after conflict, to the relative neglect of the rest of the 
community – many of which were victims of the violence and insecurity to which 
combatants contributed. This is a question that local communities and the 
international community has generally answered positively, in the context of short-
term post-conflict security-building. Prioritising the needs of ex-combatants can be 
wise and acceptable as a transitional measure in the interests of consolidating the 
peace – but only up to a point. It is now widely agreed that while ex-combatants 
should individually benefit from re-insertion packages, longer-term re-integration 
programmes should also provide benefits for the wider recipient communities.  A 
fundamental point, however, is that community acceptance of this approach is more 
likely to be undermined if there are no substantial TJ measures to address gross 
abuses or war-crimes. The acceptability and effectiveness of DDR may depend on a 
combination to parallel TJ measures and appropriate sensitivity to TJ issues within the 
DDR programme itself. Thus, DDR programmes need to take TJ issues into account 
in their eligibility criteria for DDR benefits, and in their re-insertion programmes.35 
 
4.1.7  Private security companies 
Many ex-combatants drift into employment in loosely regulated private security 
sector – a source of substantial concern. While the activities of mercenaries and 
combat-oriented private military/security firms has come to the attention of the 
world’s media, private security and military companies more commonly offer services 
ranging from military training and logistical support through to static guarding or 
close protection. Internationally, calls for better regulation of the sector are increasing 
in connection with their prominent role in theatres like Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
However, like other non-state security actors, PMCs/PSCs have been relatively 
neglected until recently within SSR. Their existence is by-and-large neglected in 
                                                 
34 For example, M. Freeman, What is transitional justice?, International Centre for Transitional Justice, 
New York, 2003.  
35 For a more substantial discussion of DDR and Transitional Justice, see for example outputs from the 
ITCJ project on transitional justice and DDR, including ‘DDR and Transitional Justice: Issue Paper for 
Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa; Kinshasa, DRC, 12 –14 June; 2007; 
UN OSAA. 
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programming, and as one study puts it, “…while SSR programmes now recognise the 
‘rightsizing’ and reform of public security agencies such as the military and police as 
key to transition and democratisation, the need to introduce similar levels of 
professionalism and accountability in the private sector has typically been neglected 
by donors and practitioners alike.”36  
 
In the absence of adequate legislation and regulation, or in circumstances where 
regulations are poorly enforced, there may be no real control over the type or quality 
of services provided by PSCs. There is a risk that PSCs function in practice as local 
militias for powerful interest groups. Inadequately-trained staff with questionable 
backgrounds may be able to access weaponry and use force in an illegitimate way. 
Where the rule of law and democratic governance is weak or where the context is one 
of widespread-armed violence, such problems will be of special concern. Even if the 
country remains politically stable, this process can contribute to a large constituency 
of armed groups in the country. Although PSCs form an important element of most 
countries’ security sector (for example, by providing security services for shopping 
centres etc), they do tend to work for local elites, diverting commitment to adequately 
resourced police services and often to not substantially enhance the security of the 
poor and vulnerable.  
 
DDR programming has been similarly remiss, with employment opportunities and 
risks in the industry receiving too little attention during reintegration planning. But 
little research has been done on ex-combatant employment in the private security 
industry worldwide and there are no substantial case studies to draw on. However, the 
initial work that has been done, coupled with media coverage and anecdotal evidence 
shows that former police and military personnel are among the favourite employees 
for private security firms. One of the few detailed research studies carried out 
anywhere in the world on this topic has shown that in South Eastern Europe, a mature 
post-conflict area, the industry is an increasingly large and important provider of 
security, the number of whose personnel often rivals or outstrips state providers.37 In 
this region at least, inappropriate links between PSCs and actors such as political 
parties, criminal gangs or paramilitaries seem to be a recurrent problem affecting a 
small number of firms. Worldwide, the growth of privatized security, depending on 
the quality of state regulation and public security provision, may either provide a 
welcome additional layer of security for citizens and property, or yet another 
challenge to law and order.  
 
Ensuring appropriate regulation and oversight of PSCs is therefore an important 
aspect of SSR in all societies, and particularly in countries emerging from conflict. 
                                                 
36 Anna Richards and Henry Smith, “Addressing the role of private security companies within security 
sector reform programmes”, Saferworld, 2007. 
37 Saferworld and International Alert, “SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern 
Europe: A 
Cause or Effect of Insecurity?”,  UNDP-SEESAC, 2005, at  http://www.seesac.org/reports/psc.pdf. 
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This would include covering this important non-state sector in initial assessments of 
both security threats and institutions through which security is delivered and reflecting 
any findings in SSR programme priorities and design.38 Appropriate regulation, 
oversight and enforcement or rules, is a priority in most countries emerging from 
conflict. If this is done well, then some of the risks from ex-combatants joining PSCs 
will be mitigated. The same applies to SALW control: ensuring that PSCs have access 
to limited or no arms also mitigates risks.  
 
DDR may also contribute more in this respect. Some DDR programmes appear to 
have taken few precautions to discourage or prevent ex-combatants joining 
inadequately regulated PSCs, or even undesirable political militias. At a minimum it 
is important that reintegration planning and implementation is carried out with a 
recognition of the sector’s importance and in the knowledge that whether by design or 
default, a proportion of ex-combatants are likely to find employment with non-state 
security providers including PMC/PMCs. Re-insertion packages could be designed to 
at least postpone or mitigate such eventualities.  Further, DDR systems for tracking of 
ex-combatants after re-insertion might (with safeguards) be use to facilitate regulation 
and control of PSCs. 
 
4.2 Experiences from selected countries emerging from conflict 
This sub-section briefly discusses some relevant experience from selected countries. 
These are necessarily brief and highly selective: space does not allow a more 
comprehensive analysis ere. Readers are referred, for example, to the case studies 
prepared as part of this project, for further relevant experience relating to DDR-SSR 
links in countries emerging from conflict.39  
 
4.2.1  Kosovo 
The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in 1999 onwards with wide-
ranging executive powers was a landmark in internationally led police development in 
post-conflict arenas. Together with the OSCE and UNDP, UNMIK established a new 
police service, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) from scratch from 1999 onwards. 
Unlike the Kosovo Protection Corps (a civil emergency service composed of the rump 
KLA in order to bring its membership wholesale under international control), the KPS 
was primarily established to fill a policing void left by retreating Yugoslav 
institutions. Nevertheless, inclusion of former KLA combatants was an important 
consideration and the KPS’s mandate required that 50% of candidates (not necessarily 
                                                 
38 Introducing background checks, licensing for companies and staff, strict limitations on the use of 
force and firearms, and establishing a clear delineation of public/private sector roles and functions and 
functioning public oversight of the industry might all be appropriate elements of SSR programming 
that takes account of the private security industry. Richards and Smith, op. cit. 
39See the materials of the “DDR and Human Security” project, at http://www.ddr-
humansecurity.org.uk. Note also that the case studies of Kosovo, Haiti, Burundi and DRC conducted 
by DCAF in its SSR and UN integrated missions project contain relevant material, particularly in 
relation to SSR (see Hanggi and Scherrer, 2008, op cit.). 
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recruits) be former KLA members. Over a remarkably short timeframe and within a 
confused political context, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has grown to around 
7,000 personnel and with the important exception of the Kosovo Serb community, 
continues to enjoy the highest popularity rating of any public institution in the 
territory. Notable achievements in relation the KPS range across human resource 
management, strategic planning, logistics, finance/budgeting and procurement. 
 
Kosovo Police School trainers regard the vetting procedures employed, and more 
broadly the deliberate inclusion of suitable ex-KLA members within the KPS’s ranks, 
as having been highly beneficial to the organisation’s growth and development. Given 
the varied skill-levels and backgrounds among rank-and-file KLA members, all 
applicants for KPS positions, regardless of background, were subject to the same 
vetting and recruitment procedures. These included written tests, interviews, 
psychological and physical tests as well as background checks.40 Although 
background checks were often incomplete due to missing documentation or witnesses 
(a problem not confined to ex-combatants), ex-combatants do not appear to have been 
overly represented among those subsequently dismissed for misconduct or 
falsification of paperwork. Moreover, training staff assert that the organization was 
moulded and strengthened in its early days through by including respected and proven 
leaders who were openly supportive of the post-war reconstruction and state-building 
project. Perhaps because of the short duration of the Kosovo conflict, the vast 
majority of ex-KLA recruits adopted a KPS identity quickly. Although UN managers 
were aware that previous KLA hierarchies and loyalties might present challenges, any 
informal reporting to former chiefs or political parties is believed to have died out 
within the first year. That career prospects within the organization offered better 
incentives than those outside surely played a part. 
 
There are however notable constraints and failings in relation to the KPS. Eight years 
after it was established by UNMIK, it remains substantially under the control of the 
international administration and CIVPOL, and subject to minimal oversight by a 
newly established Ministry of Interior and an inexperienced parliamentary security 
committee. For the first six years of its existence, KPS had no legal foundation 
whatsoever and is currently only subject to skeleton legislation passed hurriedly by 
UNMIK in 2006. The organisation’s performance also appears to have been mixed 
during the riots the swept the territory in March 2004, with others, principally KFOR, 
having to restore order as KPS floundered without a functional communication system 
and a minority of recalcitrant officers. While it appears that basic training (OSCE-led) 
has been strong in the KPS’s case, field training and overall organizational 
development (UNMIK responsibilities) have been haphazard.41 
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4.2.2  Timor Leste 
In Timor Leste following the cessation of conflict, UNTAET/UNMISET oversaw the 
training and equipping of a new police service, bringing some 3,000 uniformed 
officers up to basic standards in a short time frame. As in Kosovo, the Timor-Leste 
National Police (PNTL) has great symbolic significance and has performs many 
routine law enforcement duties. Yet the organization has exhibited numerous internal 
failings and has not been embedded well within a broader institutional and 
governmental context. The organisation has been criticized as having no development 
plan or institutional identity but rather a patchwork of allegiances among the officer 
corps and ranks and to various political figures. Lacking both a development plan and 
overarching security policy to guide it, PNTL has also seen a worrying growth of 
paramilitary units within itself whose function is unclear. PNTL’s oversight body, the 
Ministry of the Interior, also established over the same period, routinely interfered in 
operations and internal affairs, while below-par administration and procurement 
processes hindered service delivery.  
 
Externally, the organization has also been variously at odds with former armed 
factions (due to the inclusion of a minority of former officers from the period of 
Indonesian occupation), and with the national defence force, FALANTIL-FDTL. One 
report quotes Timor Leste’s senior commander of the country’s defence force as 
admitting that in 2004, the greatest threat to the country’s security was the police.42 
Like the PNTL, Timor Leste’s defence force, FALINTIL-FDTL, was the progeny of 
UNTAET and the subsequent UNMISET, both missions being mandated to build 
effective and democratic public institutions in Timor Leste. In January 2004, a dispute 
between FALINTIL-FDTL’s First Battalion (made up primarily of ex-combatants) 
and the police led to an attempted mini-coup d’état in the east of the country. In July 
2004, the Australian and British governments initiated major police reforms. In fact, 
problems such as indiscipline and politicization cut across both organizations, and in 
February 2006, one third of FALINTIL-FDTL ultimately mutinied and was 
dismissed.  
 
4.2.3  Bosnia and Herzegovina43 
Under extensive executive powers assigned by the Dayton Accord, the United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) undertook the post-war vetting of 
nearly 24,000 law enforcement staff, mainly police, between 1999 and 2000. The 
environment in post-war Bosnia presented many challenges for this work, including a 
bloated police sector whose ranks had swelled as a result of the conflict, a patchwork 
state of confused competencies designed to protect national-ethnic interests and 
                                                                                                                                            
Conflict Societies, From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, Bureau for Security Policy at 
the Austrian Ministry of Defence, DCAF, PfP-Consortium, Jun 2005. 
42 Edward Rees, ‘Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: “Improvisation and Confusion” 
from the Field’, United Nations Peacekeeping Office, March 2006. 
43 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, ‘Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses: Reforming the Police, Courts, and 
Prosecutor’s Offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff, op cit. 
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territorial gains of the conflict period, and a political class often at odds with both 
itself and international actors. Bosnia had two (initially three) ethnically-based police 
services operating independently in different territories under the direction of 
nationalist political parties. Given the crucial role of many police units in the Bosnian 
wars, each police service contained numerous ex-combatants (though they were not 
termed as such), some of whom were inappropriate for longer-term employment, 
whether due to inappropriate skills and training or dubious war records. 
 
Based on competencies assigned to it in late 1998, from November 1999 to December 
2000, UNMIBH registered all ministry of interior personnel in Bosnia, a total of 
23,751 persons, for later vetting. Over the following three years background checks 
and performance monitoring were used to ‘de-certify’ individuals. Grounds for 
exclusion included evidence of serious breaches of law or duty and acts or omissions 
from April 1992 to December 1995 which were deemed to ‘demonstrate the inability 
or unwillingness to uphold international recognized human rights standards.’44 
UNMIBH assumed all key responsibilities in this task, from reviewing information to 
conducting follow-up investigations and in the person of the UNMIBH police 
commissioner, taking the ultimate decision to approve or reject individuals for 
certification from employment with any law enforcement agency in BiH.45 Individual 
officers’ rights of appeal were limited and handled via a somewhat opaque internal 
review process, a fact which together with a low threshold of proof (de-certification 
was possible if there were ‘grounds for suspicion’), has led to criticisms of the process 
used.46  
 
By December 2002, although certification had only been actively denied to 481 
officers, only 15,786 of all applicants were granted full certification. The reduction in 
the overall size of Bosnia’s police services was a useful by-product of the vetting 
process. This in turn was accompanied by some improvement in the representation of 
ethnic minorities and women within policing agencies. Yet a recent study questions 
whether the post-war vetting process has led to any improvement in police 
performance except in minority areas where cases of harassment and other attacks 
dropped markedly.47 To date, no overall assessment of police performance in Bosnia 
in terms of ‘hard’ measures such as crime rates has been compiled. Public opinion 
surveys show either a slight improvement in popularity levels, but no real change in 
other areas such as perceptions of corruption.48 From the point of view of many 
                                                 
44 IPTF Policy P10/2002, para. 2(h). 
45 Madrid Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council Declaration—Annex, Article 
II, para. 16. 
46 No review was permitted by an independent tribunal or similar body, and officers were not permitted 
to make oral representations in support of their case. See for example, IPTF Policy P10/2002, paras. 
10–11; and IPTF Policy P11/2002, para. 13–14; and International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of 
Law and Human Rights. Principles and Definitions (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 
1966). 
47 ‘Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses’, Ibid. 
48 According to UNDP’s Early Warning surveys, public confidence in the police rose from between 
46.2% and 73.3% in 2000 to between 63.2% and 79% in 2003. UNDP Early Warning System in Bosnia 
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individual officers, both those denied certification and those who witnessed the 
inevitable confusion wrought be such widespread vetting of colleagues, this is hardly 
surprising. One the one hand, those excluded from employment continue to express 
frustration and in some cases to challenge via the European courts and appeals to the 
UN regarding a lack of due process. Many serving and retired officers also point to 
the negative effects that the certification process had on routine policing work as a 
combination of administrative confusion within UNMIBH, the removal of 
experienced personnel and an overarching discourse centring on police abuse created 
favourable conditions for criminality and eroded police morale.49  
 
Today, Bosnia’s two police services continue to operate in parallel jurisdictions and 
too little has changed.50 Progress on overall police restructuring, a contentious but 
crucial element of the international community’s state-building project there, is 
conspicuously stalled despite the lure of an EU SAA agreement.  
 
4.2.4  El Salvador51 
The cessation of armed conflict in El Salvador in 1992 saw the role of the armed 
forces being redefined constitutionally to that of external defence only in light of their 
long involvement in the country’s civil war. Policing functions that they had taken on 
in the intervening twelve years were hived-off to a new Policia Nacional Civil (PNC), 
and other policing structures dismantled. Accompanying measures included 
development of a new national security doctrine, abolition of numerous paramilitary 
structures and the introduction of a Truth Commission and enhanced judicial 
oversight of the security sector. The establishment of the PNC was viewed as one of 
several measures to demilitarize society following the peace agreement but also as 
one guarantee for the rebel Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) that 
its members would enjoy security as the group transformed itself into a political party. 
Entry to the PNC was open to FMLN members and those formerly employed by 
security structures such as the old Police Nacional (PN). According to the terms of the 
1992 peace accord, up to 20% of new candidates for the PNC could be nominated by 
the Government (from PN) and 20% by FMLN from its ranks, with the remainder 
having to be drawn from wider society.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2000, and Annual Report 2003, 
http://www.ews.undp.ba/eng/izvjestaji.asp. 
49 One former interview with a background in the Republika Srpska police maintains it became routine 
for criminal suspects to accuse arresting officers of human rights abuses in the knowledge that this 
would likely lead to an investigation against the officer or them being released without charge. Routine 
law enforcement obviously suffered in this climate. Saferworld interview with former RS police 
officer, Sarajevo, June 2007. 
50 See for example, International Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU’, 
Europe Report N°164, September 2005, available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
6 September 2005.  
51This section draws heavily on, ‘The Struggle for Lasting Reform: Vetting Processes in El Salvador’, 
Rubén Zamora with David Holiday, in Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff, op. cit.  
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The PNC’s creation has since been widely acclaimed for its contribution to the peace 
process and for the move towards a more progressive public security model than 
previous structures. However, systemic problems with criminality have dogged the 
new organization over the years. They are said to have directly flowed from a flawed 
initial vetting process and to have been compounded by other problems of recruitment 
and internal accountability. Cheating by both government and FMLN during the 
initial recruitment and vetting phase, coupled with the difficulties of carrying out 
background checks using unreliable police and guerrilla records certainly played a 
part in this, though the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), was able to 
reverse most such actions. FMLN’s success in inserting members into civilian posts in 
the PNC and youth gangs into the police academy in later years, are worth noting. 
However, weak internal accountability systems within the PNC compounded these 
problems, leading to a greater reliance on ONUSAL than would otherwise have been 
the case. Those arrangements that did exist, a disciplinary tribunal, disciplinary 
investigative unit and a control unit, were also overlapping and inefficient. The fact 
that in 1998, two years after nearly half of all police sub commissioners had been 
charged with some kind of disciplinary infraction, none had been dismissed, is 
evidence of this. Subsequent dismissals, more akin to purges, needed Presidential 
backing in the wake of high-profile kidnappings and robberies by PNC members in 
2000. The national human rights ombudsman, along with outside observers, criticized 
the lack of due process which led to hundreds of officers being dismissed that year 
and the subsequent modification of the existing police act institutionalising this 
arrangement.  
 
Although the PNC’s public approval ratings have improved since 2000, nearly one 
third of officers were subject to public complaints in 2003, indicating that serious 
problems remain. Moreover, most dismissed officers have reportedly entered 
employment in the country’s growing private security sector which is now larger than 
the PNC itself. Checks on their conduct are now obviously far fewer. The arbitrary 
and externally-driven nature of these disciplinary procedures has been noted by 
observers, as have the contributing factors such as the intense pressures placed on a 
new institution with inadequate staffing and poor leadership which operated in a 
policy vacuum.52 
 
4.2.5  Some reflections and lessons from case studies 
The examples of El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Timor Leste suggest a number of 
different considerations that those undertaking DDR in a context of police reform or 
wider SSR need to bear in mind. Firstly, questions surrounding vetting warrant 
obvious attention and the above cases offer lessons related to the vetting process itself 
(e.g. criteria, right of appeal, transparency). While a balance must obviously be struck 
between practical considerations and the need to weed out undesirables rapidly, 
vetting processes used in places such as Bosnia or Iraq have come under fire for their 
                                                 
52Ibid. 
44 
 
heavy-handed treatment of individuals in a manner not fully consistent with 
international standards. (In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has also 
come under fire for its blanket exclusion of Ba’ath party members, irrespective of 
their personal history.)53 Although independent scrutiny or judicial review of vetting 
decisions may not always be possible, some semblance of due process should be 
attached to vetting arrangements in order that they do not further undermine rule of 
law while attempting to find a role for ex-combatants. 
 
In some cases, there may also be an option of including former employees of state 
security bodies into new structures. Whereas in Iraq, Ba’ath party members were 
totally excluded from re-employment in the security sector, partial inclusion of former 
employees was attempted in Haiti and Timor Leste under UN auspices in an attempt 
to bolster new police services. In Haiti from 1994 onwards, 1,500 former military 
officers were brought into the new Haitian National Police service alongside new 
recruits, despite their association with the previous dictatorship. Vetting in this case 
was minimal and with a focus on competency rather than integrity. While this allowed 
the police service to grow rapidly, insufficient attention to the likely dynamics 
between old and new recruits led to politicization, a re-emergence of human rights 
abuses and corruption within the service.54 The longer-term perspective adopted in 
Timor Leste, and greater attention to transitional justice issues, meant that few 
officers from the era of Indonesian occupation were incorporated into the PNTL for 
fear of creating division both within the service and with the public. Although this 
presented some difficulties, the tensions between these former officers that emerged 
were not with the public at large, but with particular elements formerly associated 
with armed factions, which highlights the importance of context in dictating such 
decisions.55 Similarly in Liberia, it has not only been the country’s two partially 
demobilised armed groups, LURD and MODEL, that pose difficulties for the peace 
process and related SSR, but internal disputes within them as well as the agendas of 
their ex-combatant supporters.56 
 
A number of difficulties have outlined above in relation to the development and 
reform of the police or private security firms, but it is important to recognize that 
police and private security reform are developing fields of work with a mixed track 
record. They are difficult undertakings at the best of times and little guidance exists 
on how to design and implement programmes in a post-conflict settings. The above 
examples are drawn not just from post-conflict environments but contexts with Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs) which adds an additional layer of complexity. PSOs are 
                                                 
53Magarditsch Hatschikjan, Dusan Reljic, Nenad Sebek (eds.), Disclosing Hidden History: 
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characterized by short yet vague mandates, competition between international donors 
and institutions, and the tendency is for short-term contingencies to take precedence 
over long-term solutions to deep-rooted problems. Security institutions created or 
rebuilt under such conditions bear these hallmarks. For example, KPS and PNTL, 
both established under UN mandated administrations have both struggled to overcome 
decisions taken within the first twelve months of their creation for expedient reasons. 
 
Only a minority of the problems identified above arise from DDR programming or its 
attempted linkage with SSR. Reforming or newly established public security 
institutions face a number of different challenges post-conflict, of which the potential 
incorporation of ex-combatants is but one. These challenges remain regardless of 
whether ex-combatants are brought into the fold or not, and the dilemma may of 
whether to recruit ex-combatants into security forces needs to be seen from a number 
of different perspectives, including the capacity and intended role of those institutions, 
the symbolic importance of any such moves within the wider political settlement, and 
the societal capacity to deal with the aspirations of ex-combatants. Like society at 
large, police services will face any pressures arising from DDR processes, with or 
without ex-combatants in their ranks. The inclusion of some ex-Indonesian era police 
officers in Timor Leste’s PNTL has caused ongoing tension with the country’s 
different former armed factions, while the substantial numbers of ex-KLA fighters in 
the KPS has long overshadowed mundane questions of operational effectiveness 
among Kosovo’s Serbs.57 In Kosovo’s case, at least in the eyes of the majority K-
Albanian population, the problems of the KPS have not been to do with the inclusion 
of ex-combatants in the organization. Factors such as the politicization of public life, 
confusion over the territory’s final status and tensions between the neo-autocracy of 
UNMIK, a UN Mission with strong executive powers but no meaningful 
accountability in Kosovo itself, and an indigenous government with restricted powers, 
arguably affected the KPS far more than having ex-combatants in its ranks. 
 
But included consciously or not in SSR, ex-combatants (registered or otherwise) will 
always exert influence within SSR processes and within other forms of post-conflict 
reconstruction and state-building. Whether as individuals within the workplace or 
community, as civil society associations dedicated to their representation and 
advancement, or as the ‘rehabilitated’ politicians and government officials of the new 
state, they are bound to have influence. It is as natural for them as it is for others to 
seek positions of influence in state institutions and the better connected and savvier 
among them will see this as their ‘due’. Others may simply be drawn to occupations 
in keeping with their skills and experience – policing, military service, private 
security work all have this attraction. Cases such as Kosovo highlight the fact that 
demobilized armed factions continue to influence the political direction of post-
conflict societies in more than one way. Their acknowledged role as freedom fighters, 
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or the successful conversion from armed groups to militias, veterans’ associations or 
political parties, warrants at least as much attention. 
 
This suggests that some priorities of DDR, SSR and also transitional justice may be in 
tension, and thus co-ordination becomes a priority. Vetting processes are a case in 
point: whether stripping capable personnel out of already degraded law enforcement 
institutions and adding to the pressured environment in which their colleagues work 
(as in Bosnia) is seen as wise or necessary will depend on the primacy different 
societies and actors see the trade-offs between DDR, SSR or transitional justice 
processes. Too often, the trade-offs and judgements involved have been poorly 
explored or not dealt with explicitly enough. In relation to the possible incorporation 
of ex-combatants into the police or private security agencies, clear objectives need to 
be agreed and in doing so competing priorities weighted. As the case studies above 
show particularly in relation to police services, true institution-building (rather than 
the mere creation of police organizations with the accompanying trappings) often 
remains an elusive objective for police reform projects. Although there are clearly 
important questions around the vetting of personnel, in the future, researchers and 
practitioners would do well to consider in more detail whether the integration of ex-
combatants into new or reformed security institutions can support, or at a minimum 
not undermine, the deeper process of institutional development as a means by which 
the delivery of security and consolidation of rule of law can be achieved. This would 
entail embedding vetting and recruitment processes within long-run and 
comprehensive plans for organizational development (or in the case of private security 
market, sector development), with due attention to often neglected issues of 
developing rules and procedures, shared norms and a working ethos to bind old and 
new recruits together in a way that reflects the broader social contract or underlying 
peace building strategies.  
 
5. Assessment and Emerging Policy Implications 
 
This final section aims to bring together some of the key findings and arguments from 
this Thematic Working Paper and to explore their potential policy implications. In 
includes a discussion of the possible overall implications of linkages between DDR, 
SSR and SALW control 
 
5.1 DDR-SSR programme links and priorities for enhanced co-ordination 
This paper has, we believe, demonstrated clearly that there are many areas of overlap 
and linkage between DDR and SSR programmes and processes in countries emerging 
from war. Although DDR and SSR programmes have distinctive characteristics, they 
interlink due to overlapping aims and objectives, target groups, key stakeholders, 
functions, and operational implementation. Both DDR and SSR can contribute 
substantially to human security as well as state stabilisation, and to be effective they 
need to be integrated into a wider peace and security-building process. In each 
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sectoral area of concern to SSR, there are potentially important links with aspects of 
DDR programmes and processes. Similarly, in many contexts, the long-term 
effectiveness of DDR can be expected to depend substantially on adequate progress 
on SSR 
 
In this respect, the lack of a specific and substantial chapter providing guidance on co-
coordinating DDR and SSR was clearly a major omission in the IDDRS published in 
2007. It is therefore good news that the UN plans to prepare such a chapter by the end 
of 2008, through a task force jointly coordinated by UNDPKO and UNDP. This 
Thematic Working Paper highlights several key issue areas and priorities that need to 
be addressed by policy-makers and practitioners, which need to be addressed in such a 
new chapter of IDDRS.  
 
Similarly, SSR guidelines such as those provided in the OECD-DAC IF-SSR 
handbook need to be substantially further developed in relation to countries emerging 
from conflict.  In practice, the overall approach of these OECD-DAC guidelines were 
primarily prepared with other contexts in mind, with special post-conflict sub-sections 
added where relevant.  
 
As the UN prepares a common approach to supporting SSR in the context of 
integrated peace support missions, it is not clear how far the ‘developmental’ 
approach promoted by OECD-DAC will be maintained and successfully combined 
with the time-limited priorities characteristic of such post-conflict missions. In their 
review of SSR activities in recent UN integrated missions, Hanngi and Scherrer 
identify extensive but relatively fragmented and ad-hoc efforts to support SSR.58 The 
relatively holistic approaches associated with the Kosovo Internal Security Sector 
Review (ISSR) and the SSR approaches developed by the UN Office in Burundi were 
the exception rather than the rule. Even these two cases appear to be far from the 
practices envisaged in the OECD approach, because of the limits of local ownership: 
UNMIK’s authority to impose externally-determined strategies conditioned the 
approach in Kosovo, while the UN Office in Burundi’s holistic approach was rejected 
by national authorities in favour of a more limited piecemeal approach to SSR. More 
generally, the extensive range of SSR related activities supported in the context of UN 
peace support missions have tended to focus on immediate post-conflict priorities 
rather than the longer-term process-oriented developmental approach of OECD-DAC, 
and this may reflect enduring post-conflict political and security realities as well as 
inadequacies in UN capacity and co-ordination for SSR support. 
 
On the basis of the findings of this Thematic Working Paper, there should be no a 
priori assumption about the sequencing of DDR and SSR programmes and processes. 
There are certainly relatively ‘classical’ contexts in which DDR can be launched and 
implemented quite promptly after a peace agreement between conflict parties with 
                                                 
58 Hanggi and Scherrer (2007), op. cit.  
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relatively disciplined and defined armed forces, in which circumstances 
demobilisation and re-insertion processes may be well-advanced before SSR 
programmes start in earnest.  However, it is not even clear that this is the case for 
most post-conflict countries, let alone all. DDR programmes can be seriously delayed 
for a range of contingent reasons. Moreover, in several recent cases (including Haiti 
and South Sudan), the post-conflict context was not conducive to early large scale 
DDR, and SSR and wider community security-building activities were a relative 
priority. Thus guidelines for DDR-SSR co-ordination need to allow for a variety of 
sequencing possibilities. 
 
Similarly, it is important to recognise the limits of any guidelines for co-ordination 
between DDR and SSR that rely on close and effective planning from the outset. It is 
an important priority to aim to achieve co-ordinated or joint DDR and SSR needs and 
pre-planning assessments, and similarly for programme design and planning. 
However, there are structural limits to what can be achieved. Even in a ideal context 
of co-ordination in a country conducive to early launch of post-conflict security-
building programmes, there will be many limitations on capacity to design appropriate 
re-insertion and re-integration programmes or longer-term SSR programmes. In the 
case of SSR, for example, it would probably even be wrong in principle to define 
longer-term SSR strategies before reasonably inclusive and extended national debates 
can be held involving all relevant government ministries, parliamentary 
representatives and civil society groups. In practice, these cannot be expected to be 
substantially advanced until 1-2 years after any peace settlement. 
 
Thus, an emerging critical policy implication is to pan from the outset for a major 
‘mid-term’ review of SSR and remaining DDR priority and programmes, which may 
take place some 12 – 24 months into the post-conflict peace-building process. 
International donors and agencies should be prepared to substantially re-consider their 
support programmes at that stage, to adjust to emerging local and national preferences 
and priorities. This is required even in an ‘ideal’ case, where good SSR –DDR co-
ordination is established at the outset. It is even more important in reality, where poor 
co-ordination is likely and structural opportunities to recover the situation are needed.     
 
The specific priorities for close co-ordination between DDR and SSR programmes 
depend on the circumstances of each case. However, on the basis of programme 
analysis and practical experience discussed in sections 2 – 4 above, where DDR and 
SSR programmes are both present at the same time, they include: 
 
• Close co-ordination or partial integration for pre-planning and needs 
assessments; promoting a conducive political and security environment, and 
aspects of programme planning and design; 
• Close co-ordination and mutual support for measures to enable and develop 
local ‘ownership’ and national capacity (for assessment, policy development, 
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planning and implementation) and policy debates from the initial stages 
onwards; 
• Close co-ordination or partial integration in relation to a number of 
assessments and decisions relating to partial integration of ex-combatants into 
continuing national security sector institutions: particularly the defence forces, 
but also potentially border and coastal management institutions; police or 
auxiliary forces; and private security companies. Such decisions will 
profoundly affect both reform of these security sector institutions and the 
character and extent of DDR. 
• Co-ordination in relation to demobilisation programmes and processes 
(including re-insertion), particularly to promote ways in which SSR and DDR 
programmes can combine to ensure an environment in which both returning 
ex-combatants and their dependents and recipient communities feel adequately 
secure and have access to functioning and acceptable dispute resolution and 
justice mechanisms. These might find focus around community safety and 
security initiatives, which may also combine elements of SALW control. 
• Co-ordination of approach of DDR and SSR programmes to transitional 
justice issues and mechanisms, with the aim of maintaining appropriate 
support for TJ processes while achieving effective programming; 
• Co-ordination or partial integration of mid-term reviews (perhaps 12 – 24 
months) after the peace settlement), to ensure appropriate priorities and 
integrated approaches to human security and peace-building after the short-
term D&D and SSR priorities have been acted upon.  
• Co-ordination to enhance the role that SSR measures can play in providing a 
conducive environment for longer-term re-integration, reconciliation and 
development. 
• Co-ordination to enhance the role that DDR might play in supporting gender 
mainstreaming in SSR, and in facilitating the development of ex-combatant 
roles in civilian and democratic governance and oversight of the security 
sector.  
• Co-ordination to ensure that relevant resources and capabilities developed 
through the DDR programme is retained for the longer-term – taking 
advantage of the longer-term perspective of well-designed SSR programmes.  
 
Each of these points are discussed and substantiated in detail in sections 2-4 above.  
 
It appears to us that that time is now ripe for achieving relatively wide range support 
from relevant and experienced DDR and SSR policy-makers and practitioners now for 
the above findings. The fact that such co-ordination and synergy has so far been 
relatively rare and patchy can at least partially be explained by a range of contingent 
factors that may now be possible to overcome. These include: 
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• SSR activities and programmes have only recently emerged as a recognised 
‘normal’ and major element of post-conflict security building, and thus 
substantial opportunities for co-ordination have only recently developed in 
practice; 
• Many recent post-conflict SSR-related activities associated with peace support 
missions, relating for example to post-conflict policing or ‘rule of law’, have 
not been conceived to be part of a wider SSR strategy or process, but rather as 
emergency post-conflict security-building measures – limiting practitioners 
perceived needs for co-ordination with DDR; 
• Where DDR decisions have obviously and closely linked with decisions about 
the re-sizing and re-structuring of defence forces, there has in practice been 
high awareness of this amongst key national and international stake-holders, 
and co-ordination between DDR and this aspect of SSR has often been 
substantial without having to establish wider DDR-SSR co-ordination 
mechanisms.  
• Those post-conflict SSR programmes that have been launched with a longer 
term ‘developmental’ perspective have often not only been delayed, starting as 
D&D programme elements have been coming to a close or have ended, but 
also have not been anticipated at an early stage – limiting scope for co-
ordination in assessment, planning or design; 
• Most post-conflict SSR activities and programmes have left much to be 
desired in their own terms, and (contrary to accepted good-practice guidelines) 
have been short-term, ad-hoc and fragmented.  It is important to develop SSR 
strategies and also mechanisms and capacities for co-ordination of SSR 
programmes if adequate co-ordination with DDR is to be achieved. 
• Recently, there has been a damaging tendency to raise unrealistic expectations 
of what can be achieved through DDR programmes and a relatively 
disorganised debate about their potential scope. This has sometimes 
contributed to unsuccessful attempts to expand DDR programmes to 
incorporate whole aspects of SSR, particularly in relation to community safety 
and security initiatives, without sufficiently careful design and management.   
 
In this context, it is relatively easy to explain why effective co-ordination between 
SSR and DDR has often been lacking in the past. The time is now ripe to build on our 
foregoing analysis to develop priorities and guidelines for promoting effective co-
ordination in the future, to promote the security and well-being of the poor and 
vulnerable as well as contribute to national and regional security.  
5.2 Taking full account of different post-conflict contexts 
All good guidelines for programmes to promote security and peace-building after 
conflict emphasise the important of adapting the guidelines to specific local contexts 
and needs. Thus programmes for DDR, SSR and SSR-DDR co-ordination need to be 
customised carefully in each country, on the basis of detailed assessments. 
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Nevertheless, there is a tendency for international guidelines to make generic 
assumptions about post-conflict contexts, not least to maintain a relatively coherent 
overall approach.  
 
We believe that the IDDRS have been prone to this, underestimating the extent to 
which different contexts may imply profoundly different approaches; particularly 
where they depart in a major way from a ‘classic’ case in which an integrated DDR 
programme can be launched quite rapidly after a definitive peace agreement between 
relatively committed and well-organised conflict parties. 
 
5.2.1  Outline guidance for co-ordination in ‘classic’ case contexts 
In contexts resembling such classic cases, one could envisage the following broad 
structural approach to promoting DDR-SSR co-ordination. Firstly, ensure that 
mechanisms and capacities are mobilised to enable a co-ordinated and relatively 
integrated approach to DDR and SSR as distinctive integrated programmes. At 
present, these have become relatively well developed for DDR, but much, much more 
needs to be done to enable co-ordinated SSR programmes.  
 
Secondly, prioritise joint initial pre-planning and needs assessments for all post-
conflict peace and security-building programmes, including DDR, SSR and also 
SALW control, mine action, IDP return and so on. Thirdly, on the basis of these, aim 
to plan and design appropriate DDR and SSR programmes with appropriate close co-
ordination in areas that assessments indicate to be a priority (taking into account the 
discussion in sections 2 – 4 above). These programmes should be designed with a 
shorter-term focus on disarmament and demobilisation (including re-integration) on 
the one hand, and on immediate SSR priorities for defence restructuring, policing, rule 
of law and access to justice on the other. At the same time, preparations should be 
started for re-integration (in the case of DDR planners); capacity building for 
development of longer term SSR strategies (for SSR planners); and enabling and 
promoting local ownership (a concern for both DDR and SSR). These programmes 
should then be implemented, with effective DDR-SSR co-ordination in priority areas 
within the framework of an overall strategy for peace and security building.  
 
Then, after 12 – 24 months, a major mid-term review of all post-conflict security-
building programmes could usefully be envisaged. This would assess overall progress, 
and emerging challenges and opportunities, and for the basis for longer-term 
programmes for completing re-insertion, re-integration of ex-combatants, and the 
development of comprehensive SSR strategies. From this stage onwards, it is less 
clear that DDR should be maintained as a distinctive integrated programme separate 
from SSR or re-integration other displaced people. In principle it is possible that ex-
combatant re-integration programmes should be integrated into community safety and 
security initiatives and wider re-integration and development processes, alongside 
holistic SSR programmes developed as envisaged by OECD – DAC. 
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This outline sketch of a possible overall approach to DDR –SSR coordination is 
broadly consistent with the wider IDDRS approach to co-ordinating DDR with related 
programmes in the first 12 – 24 months. However, it deliberately envisages a more 
open approach thereafter, in which a more ‘modular’ approach to remaining DDR 
elements may be envisaged. Although DDR may continue as an integrated and 
distinctive programme, it can also be envisaged as elements integrated into wider 
security-building and re-integration processes.  
 
5.2.2  Co-ordination in contexts where DDR is substantially delayed   
For a range of reasons, DDR programmes may be seriously delayed. In these cases, 
substantial re-orientation or demobilisation of armed groups can be expected to have 
taken place, and many important SSR related issues will have evolved considerably. 
Many DDR programme elements (including special treatment for various categories 
of ex-combatant) implicitly assume that they will take place as short –term measures 
shortly after a peace settlement, and are much harder to justify for programmes that 
are launched after substantial delays. In those contexts, it may be wise to profoundly 
re-think the best ways of integrating DDR and SSR elements, within an overall 
framework of human security building and conflict prevention. 
 
In these contexts, it is not clear that the overall approach to co-ordination envisaged 
by IDDRS provides best guidance. It may be better to aim to launch SSR programmes 
at a relatively early stage, particularly in view of their wider range of programme 
elements, greater flexibility about target groups and phasing, and the importance from 
the beginning of developing local processes and capacity to take ownership of SSR 
strategy.  
 
For example, and combination of defence restructuring, establishing security 
governance institutions, and community safety and security building initiatives 
(combining SSR (such as community-policing partnerships), SALW control and 
confidence-building initiatives) might sometimes form a primary focus for early post-
conflict security building. Disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants on a 
large scale might be postponed. In this context, many elements of DDR described in 
IDDRS will remain relevant, such as those to address the special needs of camp 
followers, dependents, disabled combatants, women and children associated with 
armed groups, and also measures to facilitate ‘spontaneous’ re-insertion and re-
integration. These may be combined into a customised and partial ‘DDR’ programme, 
but might also be integrated on a more flexible modular basis into wider programmes 
to support re-integration and support for displaced people. Haiti and South Sudan 
provide two examples of such contexts, where it may have been better at the outset to 
focus on developing a customised post-conflict security building programme without 
such prominence being given to integrated DDR planning. 
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As in the classic case, a major mid-term review would be desirable after 12 – 24 
months, to reconfigure security building programmes according to emerging and 
longer-term priorities.   
 
5.2.3  Responding to risks of undesirable instrumental use of programmes by powerful local 
stakeholders 
Post-conflict security-building processes are intrinsically highly contested, with 
conflict parties and other powerful actors seeking to pursue their interests. In this 
context, ‘local ownership’ of DDR or SSR programmes can manifest itself in 
distinctly undesirable ways, as elites or sectional interests capture key national 
positions and polices. This is recognised by all international policy-makers and 
practitioners with experience of post conflict reconstruction and peace-and security 
building programmes. 
 
Experience shows that DDR programmes have sometimes been particularly 
vulnerable to instrumental use by conflict parties. They offer potentially very large 
resources to members of armed groups through their re-insertion packages, that 
powerful interest groups have an interest in securing for the own purposes – for 
example to encourage continuation of a ceasefire, maintain loyalty of combatant and 
supporter groups, or to corruptly capture a proportion of the resources for themselves. 
Although it is legitimate for DDR programme managers and their donors to 
compromise in some areas, it is also important to take action to respond to excessive 
local instrumental use of their programmes.  
 
In this context, it is important to reflect on criteria for evaluation and response. It may 
often be acceptable for local stakeholders to insist on practices that are not 
recommended in the IDDRS. Otherwise, ‘local ownership’ risks becoming an empty 
term. Further, they may be circumstances in which policy-makers legitimately decide 
to go along with instrumental use of DDR programme elements in line with a wider 
strategy for post-conflict security and peace-building. However, such decisions should 
be taken deliberately, and in line with a wide strategy, rather that in the context of 
drift and unproductive attempts to get programmes ‘back on track’. 
 
Similar comments can be made in relation to SSR, and perhaps even more powerfully. 
In a context of many competing priorities, compromises legitimately need to be made, 
particularly in the early stages of post-conflict recovery. However, some SSR 
activities may definitely not be worthy of support. It is important that SSR benefits the 
poor and vulnerable, and contributes to an overall long-term goal of enhanced 
democratic governance and accountability.  
 
The specific relevant of these comment here is that they can have profound 
implications for overall approaches to integrated programming for DDR and SSR and 
for co-ordination between them. Adherence to guidelines for integrated programming 
can help to bolster resistance to opportunistic or selfish instrumental use of DDR or 
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SSR programmes. But they do not render them invulnerable to them. It is important to 
take regular stock of the situation, and to prioritise overall post-conflict peace and 
security building over the integrated delivery of specific programmes. In contexts 
where powerful national stakeholders drive DDR and SSR according to their own 
sectional priorities, it may be better for external donors and supporters to adopt a more 
flexible, modular approach to what DDR and SSR activities they support, in line with 
a strategic political approach. International guidelines could usefully be developed to 
provide advice for these situations as well as for more benign contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear from our analysis, that there are many important actual and potential 
strategic linkages between DDR and SSR programmes. Some are much more direct 
and significant than others. This paper thus clarifies and details such significant 
linkages, and hopefully contributes to current international processes including the 
preparation of a new IDDRS chapter on the implications of such linkages for DDR 
practitioners. There are, for example, important benefits in integrating assessment and 
design of SSR and DDR, and ensuring close consultation in monitoring and review 
processes. Provisions for pooling resources and joint national capacity building are 
valuable. However, it explores and develops a case for potentially going beyond such 
a framework towards a deep co-ordination or integration of DDR and SSR 
programmes in post-conflict contexts.  
 
Some of the substantial linkages imply important potential advantages to substantially 
enhancing co-ordination of SSR and DDR programmes, and customised integration of 
particular elements of DDR, SSR and arms management in an overall post-conflict 
security building process. Some elements of disarmament and demobilisation, for 
example, might usefully directly be linked to SSR processes. Re-integration strategies 
and requirements should directly inform SSR priorities. Integrated SSR, DDR and 
arms management programmes are required to address the specific issues of small 
residual and emergent-armed groups in the post-conflict context.  
 
As discussed, substantial progress towards effective co-ordination, and partial 
integration, of DDR, SSR and SALW control programmes can be achieved in a way 
that is consistent with the overall approach underlying the IDDRS, which seek to 
retain integrated and distinctive DDR programming. However, many of our findings 
identify limits to this approach, particularly after the first 12-24 months of post-
conflict programming or in ‘non-classic’ contexts for DDR.  
 
In practice, within present frameworks there are major obstacles to effective co-
ordination of DDR, SSR and SALW programmes. The challenges of effective co-
ordination, even communication, between different programmes, internal actors, and 
external donors and institutions are well known. They are typically designed and 
implemented by different coalitions of actors and institutions, drawing on differently 
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structured and authorised resources and funds. It appears very possible that the 
emergent overarching approach of conceiving DDR, SSR and SALW as separate 
policy and programming spheres that should be co-ordinated where strategically 
necessary might make matters worse. 
 
In practice, ‘DDR’, ‘SSR’ and ‘SALW’ are labels for a wide and potentially disparate 
range of issues and programme elements. The precise ways in which these different 
programme elements should be combined to promote post-conflict security effectively 
will however be highly contingent on the particular circumstances of the country and 
region concerned. They should also depend critically on a realistic assessment of the 
likely commitment and resource allocation of relevant internal and external actors and 
organisations. In principle, it is not clear that it is better to aim for integrated 
programming within these spheres, and mere ‘co-ordination between them. 
It is not effective to develop a supposedly ideal integrated plan, which predictably will 
not and cannot be implemented because of the patterns of resources, capabilities and 
interests of the relevant actors that would need to be involved.  
 
For these reasons, we believe that there is strong potential in exploring the possibility 
of a more ‘modular’ approach to all of the types of policy and programme across the 
range of DDR, SSR and SALW programmes in post-conflict contexts. The approach 
is to explore ways in which elements from each of these spheres might be integrated 
in an overall post-conflict security building programme customised on a case by case 
basis for each situation. If institutional processes, assessments and resources were 
organised on the assumption that this is the best approach, it is possible that the 
prospects for effective integration and co-ordination to meet the security needs of 
post-conflict societies, and particularly those of the poor and vulnerable, might be 
more likely in practice to be achieved. 
 
  
